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ABSTRACT 
How does post-conflict militarization affect democratization in Sri Lanka? In 
2009, Sri Lanka ended three decades of counter-insurgency action with the separatist 
LTTE. Yet the military remains active in the reconstruction processes. Critics describe 
the deployment of the military in post-conflict reconstruction as an impediment to 
democratization. This thesis, however, argues that the deployment of the military in post-
conflict reconstruction both positively and negatively affects democratization processes 
in Sri Lanka. 
This thesis also studies the political developments from 1948 to 2016 that resulted 
in the deployment of the military internally. Then, it analyzes the effects of such military 
roles toward democratic consolidation and civil-military relations within the frameworks 
of analysis provided by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, and Thomas C. Bruneau and 
Florina Cristiana Matei.   
This thesis finds that post-conflict militarization positively affects democratic 
consolidation in the short term, but negatively in the long term. It also finds both positive 
and negative effects toward democratic civil-military relations. Sri Lanka presents a 
unique case because militarization helped the economic growth of the country during the 
conflict. Hence, this research will contribute to the studies on the effects of post-conflict 
militarization toward democratization theoretically, and in the South Asian context.  
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
In May 2009, the Sri Lankan state successfully defeated the separatist armed 
movement of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a terrorist organization that 
set back democracy in the country.1 The defeat of the LTTE, however, did not 
completely diminish security threats to the state because some groups within the Tamil 
diaspora continue to stoke separatist ideology.2 After May 2009, the government of Sri 
Lanka (GoSL) continued to deploy the military statewide to ensure continuous security 
from separatists as well as to counter other threats such as the emergence of extremist 
groups, the growth of organized crime, the challenges of maritime security and border 
control, and the worsening of ethnic divisions and communal violence.3 The civil 
authorities claim that they are using the military to reconstruct the country while they also 
provide security.  
Critics within and outside of Sri Lanka highlight the continuing internal use of the 
military in support of civil authorities, the heavy defense budget, and deployments in the 
Northern and Eastern Provinces as impediments to the process of democratization.4 In 
this context, this research asks the important question—whether post-conflict 
militarization in Sri Lanka from 2010 to 2016 affected the overall democratization 
process negatively, positively, or both. It investigates the positive and negative effects of 
the militarization on the “five arenas of a consolidated democracy,” as proposed by Juan 
J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, and the three requirements for democratic civilian control of 
                                                 
1 K.M. de Silva, “Post-LTTE Sri Lanka: The Challenge of Reconstruction and Reconciliation,” India 
Quarterly 66 (SAGE Publications, September 2012): 238. 
2 Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, “Sri Lanka’s National Security,” From the Field, Prism 4 (2014): 147–48, 
accessed March 3, 2016, https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/25047/uploads. 
3 Ibid., 153. 
4 Jonathan Goodhand holds that the Northern Province came under a “hybrid governance regime 
consist[ing] of different military and civilian structures” while all reconstruction and humanitarian actions 
were to channel through a “slow and restrictive process of vetting and clearance for access.” Jonathan 
Goodhand, “Consolidation and Militarization of the Post-War Regime,” Asian Survey 52 (January/February 
2012): 133, accessed January 20, 2016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2012.52.1.130. 
 2 
the military and effectiveness of the military in a new conceptualization of civil-military-
relations (CMR) by Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei.5  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The research question is significant for studying the implications of militarization 
toward the democratization of a state in a post-conflict transition to peace, particularly in 
the South Asian context. A study conducted by the Institute for Economics and Peace 
(IEP) reveals that only 11 out of the 162 countries studied are free from conflict, as many 
of the remaining countries face internal conflicts.6 For any state, the military instrument 
is the final means to ensure peace, stability, and security when the diplomatic, 
informational, and economic instruments fail. The use of the military in internal roles, 
however, usually does affect CMR and thus the process of democratization in the South 
Asian Context. 
In this context, this research question and the case study are significant for three 
main reasons. First, they help illustrate the implications of deploying the military in 
internal missions, particularly in a post-conflict transition to peace. During an insurgency, 
the state risks losing its sovereignty over considerable territory controlled by the 
insurgents. The Sri Lankan experience from 1971 to 2009 highlights this threat.7 After 
the defeat of the LTTE in May 2009, post-conflict reconstruction was the focus of the 
military.8 Understanding the prospects and risks associated with the deployment of the 
                                                 
5Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan propose five arenas of a consolidated democracy, which are described 
later in the chapter. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: 
Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore and London: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1996), 7; Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei’s new 
conceptualization of CMR is described later in the chapter. Florina Cristiana Matei, “A New 
Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” in The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, ed. 
Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei (New York: Routledge, 2013), 28.  
6 Adam Withnall, “World Peace? These Are the Only 11 Countries in the World That are Actually 
Free from Conflict,” Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), August 2014, accessed April 20, 2016, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/world-peace-these-are-the-only-11-countries-in-the-
world-that-are-actually-free-from-conflict-9669623.html; IEP, Global Peace Index 2015, accessed June 9, 
2016, http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Global-Peace-Index-Report-2015_0.pdf. 
7 De Silva, “Post-LTTE Sri Lanka,” 238. 
8 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - South Asia, “Sri Lanka: Executive Summary,” accessed May 
21, 2016, https://janes.ihs.com/janes/Display/1304928. 
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military in nation building during the transition to peace in Sri Lanka will provide useful 
lessons for other nations embroiled in internal conflicts.   
Second, this study highlights the implications of deploying the military in post-
conflict reconstruction efforts in the process of democratization. The existing literature on 
democratization mainly focuses on the transition from dictatorship or authoritarian 
regime to democracy. Some scholars hold that excessive military presence prevents post-
conflict reconciliation and democratization of the areas affected by the conflict.9 Sri 
Lanka provides a unique case because the defeat of the LTTE provided the state with an 
opportunity for reintegrating the Northern and Eastern Provinces into a democratic 
setting. This study is useful in understanding the complex necessity of balance between 
ensuring a secure environment and encouraging democratization in a post-conflict 
situation.  
Third, this study will discuss the CMR dimension of military deployment in post-
conflict reconstruction. In post-conflict societies, the military, at times, undertakes certain 
non-military tasks related to reconstruction and reconciliation while providing security. 
This idea supports that military involvement in the civilian sphere of responsibilities is 
necessary to a certain extent to restore normalcy, particularly considering the security 
aspect. In addition, sometimes civil authority may direct the military to undertake non-
military functions when there is no clear line between military and civilian functions in a 
post-conflict situation. The Sri Lankan case is useful to understand the complexity in 
defining the line between military and civil responsibilities, and the effects of military 
deployment in non-military functions toward CMR.   
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review surveys the relevant academic and policy literature on the 
research problem of whether or not militarization in post-conflict Sri Lanka negatively or 
positively (or both) affected the overall democratization process from 2009 to 2016. This 
will provide insights on the existing theoretical concepts and frameworks that are 
applicable to the research question and reveal the gaps in the application of that 
                                                 
9 Goodhand, “Consolidation and Militarization of the Post-War Regime,” 134. 
 4 
knowledge to the Sri Lankan context. It will contribute to the refinement of existing 
theoretical frameworks to use in a post-conflict scenario. The main theoretical concepts 
and frameworks related to this research question include democratization and the 
consolidation of democracy, CMR, and post-conflict reconstruction. Literature on Sri 
Lanka was reviewed against the identified theoretical concepts and frameworks to 
ascertain the knowledge gaps in the Sri Lankan context. 
1. Democratization and Consolidation of Democracy 
It is essential to understand what democracy is before we can assess the degree of 
democratization of a state. Democracy is an institution that gives different definitions to 
different people. Robert A. Dahl suggests that democracy is “a system of rights, liberties 
and opportunities” that are essential for the existence of a democratic government.10 On 
similar lines, Alain Touraine suggests that democracy consists of three interdependent 
dimensions: respect for basic rights, citizenship, and the receptivity of leaders.11 Stanford 
A. Lakoff sets an institutional explanation: democracy constitutes the “private sphere of 
civil society and the public spheres of citizenship and representative government.”12 The 
literature reveals the importance of functional democratic institutions towards 
democratization.  
Linz and Stepan, along with Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, maintain 
that considering “free elections as a sufficient condition of democracy is an electoral 
fallacy”; free competitive elections are just one requirement for democracy.13 Expanding 
further, Dahl establishes criteria for a democracy: “democracy provides opportunities for: 
effective participation, equality in voting, gaining understanding, exercising final control 
                                                 
10 Robert A. Dahl, “Political Equality in the Coming Century,” in Challenges to Democracy: Ideas, 
Involvement and Institutions, ed. Keith Dowding, James Hughes, and Helen Margetts (Palgrave, 2001), 10. 
11 Alain Touraine, What is Democracy (Boulder,Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), 26. 
12 Stanford A. Lakoff, Democracy: History, Theory, Practice (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
1996), 31. 
13 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 3–4; Philippe C. Schmitter 
and Terry Lynn Karl, “What Democracy Is…and Is Not,” in Journal of Democracy 2 (Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Summer 1991): 78, accessed March 23, 2016, doi: 10.1353/JOD.1991.0033. 
 5 
over the government’s agendas, and inclusion of adults in the system.”14 Keith Dowding 
also maintains that the criteria established by Dahl are essential for a state to be fully 
democratic.15 Dahl’s criteria for democracy and political participation, as suggested by 
other scholars, are useful to assess the democratization of a state. 
Schmitter suggests “five overlapping phases in the transitional phase of 
democracy: existence of authoritarian rule, collapse of authoritarian rule, democratic 
transition, democratic consolidation, and persistence of democracy.”16 Linz and Stepan 
suggest a standard to assess the extent of democratic transition: “a democratic transition 
is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to 
produce an elected government and when a government comes to power that is the direct 
result of a free and popular vote.”17 Democratization puts “democratic principles into 
practice through specific and detailed rules and procedures.”18  
Linz and Stepan establish a threshold to democratization; they posit, “citizen’s 
right to control the government through free and competitive elections is a sufficient 
condition for democratization.”19 Democratization includes liberalization that consists of 
a mix of policies and societal changes.20 Although these definitions arise in seeking an 
understanding of transition from authoritarian systems, these criteria are useful to assess 
the degree of democratization of a state that regained the areas that were under de-facto 
control of an authoritarian non-state actor.  
                                                 
14 Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy (New Heaven and London: Yale University Press, 1998), 38.  
15 Keith Dowding, “Social Capital, Civic Literacy and Political Participation: Explaining Differences 
in Voter Turnout,” in Challenges to Democracy: Ideas, Involvement and Institutions, ed. Keith Dowding, 
James Hughes, and Helen Margetts (Palgrave, 2001), 82.  
16 Philippe C. Schmitter, “The Consolidation of Political Democracies,” in Transitions to Democracy, 
ed. Geoffery Pridham (Dartmouth: Dartmouth Publishing, 1995), 541.   
17 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 3. 
18 Ibid., 10. 
19 Ibid., 3. 
20 Liberalization includes limited media censorship, wider space for working-class activities, 
fundamental rights for individuals, releasing political prisoners, improved economic benefits distribution, 
and most importantly, the toleration of opposition; Ibid., 3–4. 
 6 
Democratic consolidation is the process of strengthening democracy through 
enhanced democratic practices. In democratic consolidation, the actors, issues, and 
process are different from the democratic transition.21 Linz and Stepan assert, 
consolidated democracy is a political situation, of which, “democracy becomes the only 
game in town.”22 It can occur only in the absence a serious attempt to topple the 
legitimate regime or to break away from the state. In other words, solutions to citizens’ 
problems are readily accessible through the democratic institutions and mechanisms; they 
do not have to resort to rebellion or insurgency to win their rights. Andreas Schedler sets 
out a list of conditions for “rendering democracy the only game in the town.”23 
Linz and Stepan provide a comprehensive framework to assess democratic 
consolidation. They assert that the state needs five interacting and interdependent arenas 
for its existence. First is the availability of an “environment conducive to the 
development of a free and lively civil society.”24 Second is the availability of a valued 
political society, which is relatively autonomous.25 Third is the effective enforcement of 
“rule of law that guarantees freedom and independent associational life” of the citizen.26 
Fourth is the availability of an adaptable state bureaucracy to assist the democratic 
                                                 
21 Schmitter, “The Consolidation of Political Democracies,” 537. 
22 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 5. 
23 Andreas Schedler, “What is Democratic Consolidation?” accessed April 4, 2016, 
https://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.nps.edu/article/16883. 
24 Linz and Stepan state, “the civil society is an arena of the polity where self-organizing groups, 
movements, and individuals, relatively autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate values, create 
associations and solidarities, and advance their interests….Civil society can include manifold social 
movements, civic associations from all social strata (trade unions, entrepreneurial groups, journalists, 
lawyers, intellectual organizations, religious groupings), and most importantly the ordinary citizen who are 
not part of any organization.” Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 5. 
25 Linz and Stepan state, “Political society is an arena in which the polity specifically arranges itself to 
contest the legitimate right to exercise control over public power and the state apparatus. Although a civil 
society can destroy a non-democratic regime, democratic transition and especially democratic consolidation 
must involve a political society.” Linz and Stepan also state, “A democratic political society includes 
political parties, elections, electoral rules, political leadership, interparty alliances, and legislatures by 
which society constitutes itself politically to select and monitor democratic government.” Ibid., 8. 
26 Linz and Stepan state, “A rule of law embodied in a spirit of constitutionalism is an indispensable 
condition. It also requires a clear hierarchy of laws, interpreted by an independent judicial system and 
supported by a strong legal culture in civil society.” Ibid., 7, 10. 
 7 
government.27 Last is the availability of an institutionalized economic society.28 Of the 
literature reviewed, the five arenas framework asserted by Linz and Stepan is the most 
comprehensive framework to assess the extent of democratic consolidation of a state.  
Most writers agree upon the importance of the military’s subservience to 
democratic civilian control for democratization. One of the critical problems for a state is 
how to send the military back to barracks or how to continue to use it in peacetime for 
reconstruction without losing civilian authority after a long-term internal conflict. The 
five arenas framework for democratic consolidation and establishing democratic practices 
provides useful guidelines to understand the democratization of a state.  
2. Civil-Military Relations 
Democratic CMR is an essential condition for democratic consolidation.29 CMR 
is the link between elected civilian authority and the military in making defense policy 
decisions. Desch states that CMR is a complex subject and “most of the theoretical and 
conceptual literature focuses on domestic influences such as the character of individual 
civilian and military leaders, the structure and norms of the military organization, the 
institutions of civilian government, and the nature of the society while a small part of the 
literature looks to international variables.”30 The Sri Lankan case demonstrates the need 
to address international variables in CMR. This section of the literature review focuses on 
analyses of theoretical and conceptual literature on CMR.  
                                                 
27 Linz and Stepan note, “A lively and independent civil society, a political society with sufficient 
autonomy and working consensus about procedures of governance, and constitutionalism and a rule of law 
are virtually definitional prerequisites of a consolidated democracy. These conditions are much more likely 
to be satisfied if a bureaucracy usable by democratic leaders and an institutionalized economic society 
exist.” Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 10–11. 
28 According to Linz and Stepan, “There cannot be a consolidated democracy in a command economy 
or in a pure market economy. Significant degrees of market intervention and state ownership for self-
sufficiency of the market requires corporation laws; the regulation of stock markets; regulated standards for 
weights, measurements, and ingredients; and the protection of both public and private property.” Ibid., 16. 
29 Schedler, “What is Democratic Consolidation.”  
30 Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore 
and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 1. 
 8 
Desch summarizes various indicators suggested by different analysts to measure 
CMR.31 Some analysts suggest that understanding the extent of military influence in 
areas beyond strictly military issues is a measure of CMR; the line between civilian and 
military responsibilities is not clear, however, especially when the military takes on non-
military functions at the request of the civilians.32 Desch posits that excessive military 
influence on national policy debates is a potential problem, although he does not state 
what is excessive.33  
Several scholars suggest civilian control over the military is necessary for 
democratization. Dahl argues, “The circumstances most favorable for competitive politics 
exist when access to violence…is either dispersed or denied to oppositions and to 
government.”34 Carl von Clausewitz furthers the importance of the military’s 
subservience to civilian control, stating that the “subordination of the political point of 
view to the military is not possible and the subordination of the military point of view to 
the political is therefore, the only thing possible.”35 Samuel Huntington’s objective 
control and military professionalism shaped discussions on civilian control of the military 
for decades. He writes, “A highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry out the 
wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state.”36  
Contrary views have emerged more recently that may be more relevant to 
contemporary internal conflicts. Samuel E. Finer holds that there is “no reason to argue 
that civilian control over the military is natural because the military is an independent 
political force, which possesses vastly superior organization and arms.”37 Thomas C. 
Bruneau also points out that there are some requirements for CMR to be effective. He 
                                                 
31 Desch, Civilian Control of the Military, 3–4. 
32 Ibid., 3. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1971), 51. 
35 Clausewitz, Carl von, On War, Anatol Rapoport (England: Penguin Books, 1968), 405. 
36 Veena Gill, “India,” in The Political Role of the Military, ed. Constantine P. Danopoulos and 
Cynthia Watson (London: Greenwood Press, 1996), 171. 
37 Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (New Jersey: 
Transaction Publishers, 2002), 4–5.  
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states, “Efficiency in the use of resources refers to the ability to fulfill the assigned roles 
and missions at the optimum cost.”38 It is difficult to conceptualize the efficiency in 
national security matters and its objectives because assumptions are the basis of 
discovered material on measures of efficiency.39 
In addition, pointing out the adverse consequences of objective civilian control, 
Matei posits that the “objective civilian control over the military undermining the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the military” can adversely affect national security.40 The 
latter, therefore, proposes a new comprehensive framework for CMR. The framework 
addresses the requirements and priorities of both modern security issues and the process 
of democratic consolidation of any state. The trinity framework consists of the 
“democratic civilian control of the military,” the military’s effectiveness in performing its 
missions, and the military’s efficiency in accomplishing the “roles and missions at 
minimum cost.”41 Matei states that there are two challenges in the present global 
environment: “one is to assert and maintain control over the military and the other is to 
develop effective militaries, police forces, and intelligence agencies to perform a wide 
variety of roles and missions.”42 The missions come under six categories: “external and 
internal wars, counter terrorism, crime prevention, humanitarian assistance, and peace 
support operations (PSO).”43  
Matei conceptualizes control based on “authority over the institutional control 
mechanisms, oversight, and the creation of professional norms.”44 She also suggests that 
the military needs three requirements to be effective. First, there must be a plan in the 
form of a doctrine or strategy. The second requirement is the availability of institutional 
mechanisms such as defense ministries, interior affairs ministries, a national security 
                                                 
38 Thomas C. Bruneau, “Efficiency in the Use of Resources,” in The Routledge Handbook of Civil-
Military Relations, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei (New York: Routledge, 2013), 39. 
39 Bruneau, “Efficiency in the Use of Resources,” 40. 
40 Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” 28. 
41 Ibid., 26. 
42 Ibid., 29. 
43 Ibid., 31.  
44 Ibid., 30. 
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forum or council, and other means to establish joint or interagency cooperation.45 Third, 
sufficient financial and material resources are required to equip, train and modernize the 
militaries.  
Thomas-Durell Young describes the sources of tensions in CMR. There are 
conflicting interests between the civilian leadership and the military.46 The military 
always struggles for equipment and training to win the wars while the elected officials 
have to “serve the wider policies of the state.”47 In this context, Young asserts three 
possible areas for tensions between the civilian leadership and the military. First is the 
military elite’s “dissatisfaction or disappointment with political leadership” over 
“insufficient resources to meet the national security requirements established by the 
state.”48 Second, the perception that civilian leaders are anti-military and their political 
ideology is against the “military’s professional ethos of political neutrality.”49 Third is 
the perception that as a moral institution of society, the military is responsible to “rescue 
society from corrupt or incompetent officials through a coup.”50 Finally, a division within 
the military over policy or strategy can result in tension between the political leadership 
and the military.51 
More recently, scholars have also pointed to keeping the military in balance to 
civilian authority. The power elite often see the militarized society as an outcome of 
societal militarization. Patrick M. Regan uses the term elite as proposed by C. Wright 
Mills; he posits that the power elite consisted of the heads of the largest corporations, the 
political leadership, and the military leaders.52 Regan defines militarism as the 
                                                 
45 Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” 30. 
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51 Ibid., 24 
52 Patrick M. Regan, Organizing Societies for War: The Process and Consequences of Societal 
Militarization (London: Greenwood Press, 1994), 6. 
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inculcation of military-based values to the society and militarization as the preparation of 
the society for war.53 Describing how CMR shapes a militarized society, Patrick M. 
Regan notes Harold Lasswell’s assertion: “ruling elite manipulate the threat symbols of 
nationalism to serve as a useful tool for maintaining popular support behind the 
increasing influence of the military over civil affairs of the state.”54 
In CMR theories, there is a notion that militaries are not suited for internal 
missions. Anshu N. Chatterjee provides a framework to analyze CMR in post-colonial 
democracies in considering the Indian military.55 Chatterjee suggests that military 
employment in internal operations negatively affects the cohesion and professionalism of 
the military.56 In such context, the Indian military’s activities come under democratic 
civilian control, but the military’s role in the insurgencies is controversial and 
understudied.57 Veena Gill refers to the “use of the military for internal security” as the 
internal political role providing an account to the political role of the Indian Army.58 Gill 
describes the politicization of the military as the socialization of the military with 
political values, which are outside of the traditionally expected military competence, 
fighting wars.59  
Gill points out other negative implications in the use of the military for internal 
missions. First, the military acquires political influence due to the nature of its interaction 
with the polity and its internal organization. Second, it reduces the Army’s impact and 
credibility. Third, “excessively frequent and avoidable involvement in maintaining law 
and order has also alienated the Army from the people, the Army being accused of 
behaving as an occupation force in affected states, perpetrating excesses on its own 
                                                 
53 Regan, Organizing Societies for War, 5. 
54 Ibid., 2. 
55 Anshu N. Chatterjee, “Shifting Lines of Governance in Insurgencies: India,” in The Routledge 
Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei ( New York: 
Routledge, 2013), 168. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid., 167. 
58 Veena Gill, “India,” 181. 
59 Ibid. 
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people and violating human rights.”60 Chatterjee notes Muthiah Alagappa’s view that 
frequent military deployment in internal security matters creates problems because the 
civil authority’s status relies on the balance between coercion and public support.61 
Neloufer de Mel asserts, “when civilian leaderships put military power to civil use to 
save the nation or to solve political problems, this process itself militarizes society.”62 
The experiences of the Indian military provide a good insight into the risks involved in 
the military’s internal security role in the South Asian context. This framework is also 
useful for understanding the Sri Lankan situation.    
3. Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
Post-conflict reconstruction is a paramount process in state building after the 
termination of a conflict. While there is important literature that focuses on post-conflict 
reconstruction, it is primarily based on a mass-scale involvement of international actors 
such as the United Nations (UN), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the 
World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), focusing on the post-Cold war 
period. This section of the literature review focuses on examining the concepts of post-
conflict reconstruction and analyzes how those concepts can be applicable to the Sri 
Lankan context.  
Yosef Jabareen provides a comprehensive “framework for post-conflict and on-
going conflict reconstruction of a failed state.”63 Jabareen states, “post-conflict 
reconstruction has evolved into grand strategy with a grand narrative” in recent years, 
including the “creation of a new global agenda.”64 Jabareen proposes a new model to 
conceptualize post-conflict reconstruction. This conceptual framework “refers to a 
                                                 
60 Veena Gill, “India,” 182–183. 
61 Chatterjee, “Shifting Lines of Governance in Insurgencies: India,” 169. 
62 Neloufer de Mel, Militarizing Sri Lanka: Popular Culture, Memory and Narrative in the Armed 
Conflict (New Delhi, Sage Publications, 2007), 23. 
63 Yosef Jabareen, “Conceptualizing Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Ongoing Reconstruction of 
Failed States,” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 26 (June 2013): 107, accessed March 
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network or a plane of interrelated concepts that together provides a comprehensive 
understanding” of post-conflict reconstruction.65  
Jabareen’s study uses eight important concepts to theorize post-conflict 
reconstruction.66 The first concept is the condition of a failed state; the state is unable to 
exercise the monopoly of violence over its designated territory and its population.67 
Although the situation may change on termination of the conflict, the threat may persist 
in non-military forms if the root causes for the conflict have never diminished. External 
intervention is the second concept.68 This concept posits that external military 
intervention and state building are necessary to achieve the expected international order.  
The third concept is the critical aspect of sequencing the process. The sequence 
should be law and order, security, development of the economy, and finally democracy.69 
Emphasizing the importance of security, Francis Fukuyama writes, “state building in a 
strict sense is about creating the Weberian monopoly of legitimate violence over a 
defined territory and therefore has at its core the concentration of the means of 
coercion—in practical terms, armies and police—under the control of a central political 
authority.”70 The wrong sequencing is risky and Fukuyama asserts that state building 
should be accomplished on proper sequencing rather than under liberal and democratic 
rules, which may lead to the eventual reemergence of conflict.71 The military has to play 
a vital role in providing security, reinstallation of order, disarmament of combatants, and 
demining.  
Jabareen’s fourth crucial concept is the provision of security for the 
reconstruction process.72 A successful reconstruction process demands a favorable 
                                                 
65 Jabareen, “Conceptualizing Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” 110. 
66 Ibid., 108. 
67 Ibid., 111. 
68 Ibid.,112. 
69 Ibid., 114–115. 
70 Francis Fukuyama, “Liberalism versus State-Building,” Journal of Democracy 18 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2007), 12.  
71 Ibid. 
72 Jabareen, “Conceptualizing Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” 115–116. 
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environment through a balance of security, political, and economic aspects. The fifth 
concept is the reduction of conflict through reconstruction.73 Economic development can 
play a major role in conflict prevention. A higher level of economic growth rate and 
income level of the citizens reduce the risk of conflict reemergence. Democratization and 
liberalization of the state is the sixth concept.74 This concept involves the application of 
democratic and liberalization principles to the conflict-affected areas.  
Use of multi-level actors is the seventh concept.75 The reconstruction process 
should be an inclusive mechanism that incorporates state, non-state, and international 
actors. The people should realize that the reconstruction process is their own. Therefore, 
the greater the participation of local actors, the more the process will succeed.76 The final 
concept is the holistic approach and inclusive themes of reconstruction.77 Jabareen posits 
four interrelated themes for reconstruction: political, economic, social, and provision of 
security.78 Jabareen’s post-conflict reconstruction conceptual framework is well suited to 
a post-conflict context; it does not provide any mechanism to measure the implications of 
using the military for reconstruction, however, which is where some scholars argue on 
militarization in Sri Lanka.   
Kristine Hoglund and Camilla Orjuela propose the conflict prevention theory, 
which consists of two measures “preventing a relapse to violent conflict and constructing 
a self-sustained peace.”79 Hoglund and Orjuela further propose four ways to undertake 
those two measures: the demobilization, demilitarization, and reintegration (DDR) of 
former combatants; the sharing of political power; the justice and actions for 
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reconciliation; and the post-conflict reconstruction and development of the economy.80 
The four measures for conflict prevention suggested in the above literature are useful to 
assess the reconstruction process, although they do not discuss in detail the implications 
of using the military for reconstruction towards democratization. 
4. The Sri Lankan Context 
Scholars describe Sri Lanka as a Third World “model democracy” after 
independence in 1948; it completed the democratic transition according to the framework 
established by Linz and Stepan early in the post-colonial phase.81 The major threat to Sri 
Lanka emerged in the 1980s in the form of a violent secessionist movement waged by the 
LTTE.82 After that, one sixth of the country (the larger part of the Northern and Eastern 
provinces) fell under the control of the separatist LTTE organization.83 The Tamils lived 
in those areas under the LTTE, lost their democratic rights and experienced a drop in 
living standards.84  
After the defeat of the LTTE in May 2009, the Northern and Eastern provinces 
returned to de-jure government control; this fulfilled the prerequisite for democratic 
consolidation, according to Linz and Stepan: the existence of a state. Effective 
reintegration of the liberated areas with the rest of the country while preventing the 
resurgence of separatism was a formidable task that lay in front of the government. The 
military played a dominant role in the post-conflict reconstruction process.85  
Some scholars suggest that internal political setting has shaped Sri Lanka’s 
democracy and its relationship with the military. Siri Gamage posits that liberal 
democracy in Sri Lanka declined due to civilian authorities’ use of the military to attain 
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power. Gamage holds that the transformation of the “Westminster-style parliamentary 
system to an executive presidential system” in 1978 increased the militarization of the 
political process.86 Gamage also holds that militarization was successful in protecting the 
country’s integrity during the separatist LTTE terrorism; therefore, it contributed to 
maintain state sovereignty.87  
During the main research period of study from 2010 to 2016, former president 
Mahinda Rajapaksa was in power, which was the period of reconstruction, reconciliation 
and militarization. Some scholars hold that governance under Rajapaksa undermined the 
implementation of the post-conflict reconciliation process and democratic principles. 
Stone asserts that the military became heavy-handed and the state undertook a militarized 
development process instead of a real devolution of power to bring a lasting peace.88 The 
Crisis Group Asia Report 2011 states that, since 2005, the military dominated the life in 
the north since there has been no reduction in the military presence.89 The Crisis Group 
Asia Report 2013 states that Sri Lanka’ democratic governance has significantly 
deteriorated in the post-conflict era.90  
Some literature, however, suggests that there has been a significant transformation 
of the democratization process after 2015 and that the government remains at the center 
of post-conflict CMR and democratization. Present President Maithripala Sirisena came 
to power in 2015 and established a national unitary government, a coalition between the 
United Peoples’ Freedom Association (UPFA) and the United National Front for Good 
                                                 
86 Gamage, “Democracy in Sri Lanka,” 110–111. 
87 Ibid., 109, Gamage points to M. Moore’s three main causes of “decline in liberal democracy in Sri 
Lanka: increasing domination by politicians over the elements of the state apparatus and over society 
generally disregarding legal and procedural formality, sharpening of ethnic conflict, and increasing 
recourse to arms in the attempt to attain power and the consequent physical and political strengthening of 
the armed forces, who have successfully protected the integrity of the state.” 
88 Jason G. Stone, “Sri Lanka’s Postwar Descent,” Journal of Democracy 25 (Johns Hopkins 
University Press, April 2014), 151, accessed February 28, 2016, doi: 10.1353/jod.2014.0024. 
89 International Crisis Group, “Reconciliation in Sri Lanka: Harder than Ever,” Asia Report 209 (July 
2011), accessed May 8, 2016, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka.aspx. 
90 International Crisis Group, “Sri Lanka’s Authoritarian Turn: The Need for International Action,” 
Asia Report 243 (February 2013), accessed May 8, 2016, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/
south-asia/sri-lanka/243-sri-lankas-authoritarian-turn-the-need-for-international-action.pdf. 
 17 
Governance (UNFGG).91 The Crisis Group Asia Report 2016 suggests that the change 
gave Sri Lanka a historic opportunity to rebuild democracy, and Sri Lanka has made 
significant progress.92 The report also asserts that although the military reduced its 
presence and interference in civilian affairs, there is no significant change in the 
military’s role.93 
In addition, important literature also points to transformation of CMR and 
democratic practices during the conflict between the state and the LTTE.94 Muthiah 
Alagappa suggests that deployment of the military in an internal role allowed the abuse of 
state power and erosion of democratic rights at the local level.95 Alagappa asserts that Sri 
Lankan political leaders’ failure to provide sociocultural and political solutions to the 
internal conflict resulted in adverse consequences for civil society and CMR, particularly 
in the conflict-affected areas.96 Although the LTTE was defeated in May 2009, the 
military remains deployed in conflict-affected areas. According to the Ministry of 
Defense (MOD), the immediate need for military deployment was the restoration of 
normalcy and reconstruction tasks that are essential for nation building.97  
Critics within and outside of Sri Lanka widely described these activities as the 
militarization of the state that affects CMR and democratization.98 Ahmed S. Hashim 
posits that the military has intruded in “every aspect of the society, including government 
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administration, diplomatic corps, politics, reconstruction, and the economy.”99 Hashim 
asserts, “Militaries are neither effective national development agencies” nor “efficient 
economic organizations.”100 The spread of the military’s influence in spheres beyond its 
purview poses dangers to its professionalism, creates interests beyond military values, 
and possibly creates the “tendency to interfere in the political process.”101 Using the 
CMR framework proposed by Bruneau and Matei, this thesis examines the deployment of 
the military in post-conflict reconstruction and how it shapes the CMR.  
The reviewed literature on Sri Lanka’s post-conflict reconstruction posits mixed 
effects of deploying the military in post-conflict reconstruction. Hoglund and Orjuela use 
the four measures model to examine conflict prevention in Sri Lanka and argue that 
heavy militarization becomes the approach for conflict prevention.102 Devoic uses the 
same model used by Hoglund and Orjuela to examine the Sri Lankan context and posits 
that the deployment of military for reconstruction together with Tamil construction 
companies has been a useful conflict prevention technique. According to Devoic, conflict 
sensitivity has led the government to focus on physical reconstruction and the military 
plays a successful role in accomplishing reconstruction projects together with military 
information operations, which assisted in prevention of any separatist violence after May 
2009.103  
Some of the literature focuses on the negative effects of using the military in post-
conflict reconstruction. Stone posits that the reconstruction of northern Sri Lanka has 
been a military project because the military officers dominated the Presidential Task 
Force (PTF). Also, he asserts that the PTF has denied civil society groups and media to 
see what has been going on, while restricting the involvement of international NGOs who 
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are critical to the military’s conduct in reconstruction works.104 Meanwhile, the 
International Crisis Group reports assert that military presence in conflict-affected areas 
is an impediment to the reconciliation process. Conversely, Jane’s Sentinel Security 
Assessment states that the military was successful in assisting the civil authorities in the 
resettlement of nearly 300,000 IDPs and rehabilitation of former LTTE cadres.105 
Therefore, it is important to understand the positive and negative effects (and the 
literature suggests both) of deploying the military in post-conflict reconstruction.  
Most of the reviewed literature does not account for the strategic environment of 
the country during the post-conflict reconstruction period and there is a considerable gap 
in the discussion on the context of using the military. The literature mainly asserts that 
deploying the military for post-conflict reconstruction is an impediment to democratic 
CMR and democratization. Using the post-conflict reconstruction framework, I examine 
the short-term deployment of the military in post-conflict reconstruction and its impact on 
democratic CMR and democratization in the Sri Lankan context, which will complement 
the existing literature.  
D. HYPOTHESES 
The literature review provides both positive and negative effects of using the 
military in post-conflict towards the democratization process in Sri Lanka. The defeat of 
the LTTE in May 2009 provided the state with an opportunity to consolidate the 
monopoly of the use of force over the sovereign territory; there was a necessity, however, 
to transform the security environment for the reinstitution of the civilian bureaucracy. In 
view of this factor, the government continued military deployment in the internal security 
role and statewide nation-building efforts, particularly in the conflict-affected areas. In 
this context, during the period from 2009 to 2016, the military’s prominent role in post-
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conflict reconstruction provides three potential hypotheses on the democratic 
consolidation. 
The first hypothesis is that the military’s deployment in post-conflict 
reconstruction positively affects the democratization process. Although the LTTE was 
defeated, the continuing separatist threat demands the continuing military deployment in 
consolidating security, which will then allow for political settlement of grievances of the 
Tamil population and the IDPs. The military was able to support the civilian bureaucracy 
to establish control and fulfill urgent reconstruction tasks. Meanwhile, the GoSL used the 
military’s skilled work force for statewide nation-building projects. Deployment of the 
military in post-conflict reconstruction has had positive implications for democratization 
during the research study period from 2009 to 2016.     
The second hypothesis is that the military’s deployment in post-conflict 
reconstruction negatively affects the democratization process. Although the separatist 
threat continues after the defeat of the LTTE, there is no purpose of continuing the 
military’s internal security role in the absence of an armed threat. Other issues require 
political or diplomatic solutions. The military deployment in civilian tasks undermines 
the civilian bureaucracy’s capacity and hinders the strengthening of democratic 
institutions. Consequently, continued deployment of the military has negative 
implications towards democratization.     
The third hypothesis is that the military’s deployment in post-conflict 
reconstruction has both negative and positive implications towards the democratization 
process. The continuing military employment is successful in preventing the resurgence 
of armed separatism. Also, the military’s internal security role and engagement in 
reconstruction were not new phenomena for Sri Lanka. On the other hand, continuing 
internal security presence affects the military’s effectiveness and efficiency in its 
professional role. Although there are short-term positive implications in the deployment 
of the military in post-conflict reconstruction, it has had larger negative impacts towards 
democratization during the research’s study period from 2009 to 2016.        
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E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research is a single case study of the post-conflict transition in Sri Lanka. 
This study will be qualitative research based on empirical evidence. The data will be 
collected from secondary sources: books, articles, journals, reports, newspaper articles, 
government statistics, and other sources. The study of the Sri Lankan case will contribute 
to understanding the effects of using the military in the internal role towards democratic 
CMR and thus to democratization. This section outlines the use of key concepts and 
frameworks to answer the research question. 
First, the political developments and CMR from 1948 to 2010 are assessed. The 
discussion focuses on how the political developments and resultant military missions 
affect democratic consolidation and CMR. Linz and Stepan’s prerequisite and five arenas 
of democratic consolidation and the trinity framework on CMR proposed by Bruneau and 
Matei, described above, are the models used for this purpose.  
Second, the strategic environment of Sri Lanka at the end of the conflict in May 
2009 is discussed to assess the need for deployment of the military in post-conflict 
reconstruction. Then, how the political developments resulted in the continued military 
deployment or disengagement in post-conflict reconstruction is assessed. The discussion 
focuses on how the military’s deployment affected democratic consolidation and CMR.    
Third is the analysis of effects of the post-conflict militarization toward 
democratization in Sri Lanka. This thesis analyzed how the different military missions 
affected the democratic consolidation and CMR, and derived the two aspects of the 
research problem. It examined the positive and negative effects of the militarization on 
the five arenas of democratic consolidation, as proposed by Linz and Stepan, and the 
effects of militarization toward democratic civilian control of the military and the 
military’s effectiveness.    
F. THESIS OVERVIEW  
This research organizes in five chapters. The first chapter introduces the subject to 
provide a solid understanding of the research problem. The literature review provides 
scholarly concepts and frameworks on democratization, democratic CMR, post-conflict 
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reconstruction, and the Sri Lankan context. The second chapter discusses the political 
developments and CMR from 1948 to 1990, setting the background to the conflict 
between the GoSL and the LTTE. The third chapter is on the political developments and 
CMR during the high intensity conflict from 1990 to 2010. Both Chapters II and III focus 
on the effects of deployment of the military in internal security and nation building 
missions, democratic consolidation and CMR. They provide the understanding of the 
evolution of CMR since independence.  
The fourth chapter focuses on the effects of deploying the military in post-conflict 
reconstruction from 2010 to 2016. This chapter applies the theoretical concepts and 
frameworks identified in the literature review to discuss important aspects related to post-
conflict reconstruction. The fifth chapter is the analysis and conclusion. The analysis 
focuses on identifying the positive and negative effects of using the military in post-
conflict reconstruction and statewide nation-building missions towards democratic 
consolidation and CMR. The conclusion summarizes the research conducted and its 
results.  
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II. DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION AND CIVIL-MILITARY 
RELATIONS: 1948 TO 1990 
Ceylon became a sovereign state within the British Commonwealth of Nations on 
February 4, 1948.106 Since 1948, alternating civilian governments dominated by the two 
main political parties of the country, the United National Party (UNP) and Sri Lanka 
Freedom Party (SLFP), or the coalitions led by those parties governed the country. Sri 
Lanka has also experienced three violent armed insurgencies since 1948. Two of them 
were the 1971 and 1987–1990 communist insurrections of the Janatha Vimukthi 
Peramuna (JVP) that attempted to overthrow the government. The third was the LTTE’s 
separatist insurgency of 1983–2009, which attempted to establish a separate state, the 
Tamil Eelam, in the Northern and Eastern provinces and was able to establish de facto 
control over those areas by the 1990s. The combination of the different policies of the 
two major political parties and the resultant threats that required military missions has 
shaped CMR and the structure of democracy in the country. Some effects of CMR were 
positive, while others have been negative, for democratic consolidation.  
This chapter discusses the status of democratic consolidation and the CMR of Sri 
Lanka from 1948 until the 1990s. It sets forth the background that is essential to examine 
the effects of the military’s deployment during the conflict toward CMR and thus toward 
democratic consolidation. The discussion focuses on the critical political developments 
that affected the prerequisites and five arenas of democratic consolidation and CMR 
during two distinctive periods: the dominion period from 1948 to 1972 and the republican 
period from 1972 to the 1990s in which the LTTE became a significant challenge to the 
state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.  
A. THE DOMINION OF CEYLON: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS FROM 
1948 TO 1972 
Sri Lanka was a dominion of the British Commonwealth of Nations after 
independence. Since the 1930s, the country enjoyed electoral democracy and the 
                                                 
106 S.A. Pakeman, Ceylon (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publisher, 1964), 165. 
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pluralistic political system. The Soulbury Constitution of 1946 became the governing law 
of the country until the enactment of the Republican Constitution in 1972. The political 
power competition between the UNP and the SLFP and the policies of those governments 
resulted in critical events that shaped democratization process. This section discusses the 
transition to a democracy and the Citizenship Acts, the Sinhala Only Act and the rise of 
federalist ideology, and the JVP insurrection of 1971.   
1. Transition to a Democracy and the Citizenship Acts: 1948–1956 
Sri Lanka transitioned peacefully from a British colony to an independent state in 
1948. The establishment of the executive, legislative, and judiciary institutions for the 
functioning of the modern state took place during colonial rule.107 In the late 1940s, 
Ceylon had universal adult vote and a plural political society comprised of the center-
right UNP, traditional and revolutionary left-wing parties, and communal-political 
parties.108 The Soulbury Constitution of 1946 established a unitary state with a 
convocational device, a system of communal representation.109 Having reached a 
sufficient agreement with the Ceylonese government on the future governance of the 
country, the British granted independence to Ceylon on February 4, 1948, as a unitary 
state with parliamentary democracy within the British Commonwealth of Nations.110  
                                                 
107 Neil De Votta states that essential elements of a state had developed in Ceylon at the time of 
independence. Neil De Votta, “Control Democracy, Institutional Decay, and the Quest for Eelam: 
Explaining Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka,” Pacific Affairs 73 (2000), 55–56, accessed December 19, 2015, 
http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/pdfplus/2672284.pdf?acceptTC=true.  
108 D.S. Senanayake organized the United National Party (UNP) in September 1946. Trotskyist Lanka 
Sama Samaja Party (LSSP), Marxist Communist Party (CP), and Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP) were 
the main traditional-left parties. The Marxist-Leninist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) was a 
revolutionist-left party. The communal political parties in the 1920s were the European Association (1918), 
All Ceylon Malay Association (1922), and the Ceylon Muslim League (1924). In the 1930s, more 
communal parties came up. They were the All Ceylon Moors’ Association (1935), the Burger Political 
Association (1938), the Sinhala Maha Sabha (1937), the Ceylon Indian Congress (1939), and All Ceylon 
Tamil Congress (1944); A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka 1947–1973 (London and Basingstoke: 
The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1974), 13, 130, 151. 
109 The Soulbury Constitution of 1946 provided weightage for the ethnic minority representation: 
Ceylon Tamils 12–14 seats, the Indian Tamils 10–8 seats, the Muslims 6–4 seats, and 6 nominated seats for 
the minorities in a house of 101 members. A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, The Break-Up of Sri Lanka: The 
Sinhalese-Tamil Conflict (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988), 18. 
110 K.M. de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985 
(Lanham and London: University Press of America, 1986), 138. 
 25 
The British colonial powers, however, left legacies that continued to affect the 
country’s political, social, and economic arenas. The communal representation introduced 
by the British shaped political mobilization that followed independence; eventually, it 
resulted in an armed conflict that affected the consolidation of democracy. Also, the 
military continued its colonial culture and structure until the end of the 1950s. The 
majority of the population was Sinhalese Buddhists. Sri Lankan Tamils (primarily 
Hindus), constituted the largest minority and this has remained so (see Table 1).111 
Ceylon transitioned to a democracy with the Sinhalese Buddhists questioning whether 
they received their due socio-economical rights as the majority versus the favored 
minorities.112 Meanwhile, Ceylon Tamils sought to maintain their political power and 
socio-economic benefits enjoyed during the colonial rule. The quest for selective 
incentives led to the political competition between the Sinhalese and the Tamils that 
resulted in a clash between the two groups.  













Sinhalese 69.4 69.4 70.6 72 74 
Sri Lankan Tamils 11 10.9 11 11.4 12.6 
Indian Tamils 11.7 12 11.1 8.9 5.6 
Muslims 6.5 6.7 6.7 7.1 7.1 
Others 1.4 1 0.6 0.6 0.7 
 
                                                 
111 According to 1953 census, Sinhalese – 5,616,705, Ceylon Tamils – 884,703, Indian Tamils – 
974,098, Moors and Malays – 536,889, Burghers – 45,950, and others – 7,311. Pakeman, Ceylon, 245. 
112 De Votta states, “In keeping with Britain’s divide-and-rule policies, her authorities in Sri Lanka 
badly favored minority communities at the expense of the majority community’s religion, language and 
culture. Independence was therefore seen as a mechanism by which Buddhism, the Sinhala language and its 
intertwined culture could be restored to its rightful place of prominence and dominance.” De Votta, 
“Control Democracy,” 58. 
113 Adapted from C.I.C.R.E.D. Series, The Population of Sri Lanka, 1974, accessed on August 24, 
2016, Table 3.16,44, http://www.cicred.org/Eng/Publications/pdf/c cc46.pdf and Kenneth D. Bush, The 
Intra-Group Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Learning to Read between the Lines (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), Table 3.1, 40. 
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The emergence of ethnic, linguistic, and religious nationalism became apparent 
soon after independence. Prime Minister D.S. Senanayake, and his successors in the 
UNP, Dudley Senanayake, and Sir John Kotelawala, opted to maintain the dominion 
status and territorial nationalism through the policies on secularism and language parity 
to both Sinhala and Tamil.114 The powerful left-wing political parties also maintained the 
secular policies, but they opposed the dominion status. Also, the left-wing instigated 
labor unrest causing severe political and economic issues; the military deployment was 
frequent to maintain essential public services during strikes.115 The military’s 
deployment to solve political problems helped to provide security, but affected the rule of 
law and the activities of trade unions and left-wing political parties. Also, the UNP, based 
on liberal democratic norms, disregarded the left-wing political parties, leaving out 
important groups that had a significant constituency.116 The Indian Tamil population was 
a major vote base of the left-wing political parties.  
Meanwhile, the Citizenship Acts of 1948 and 1949 increased the divisions within 
the civil and political societies.117 The increase in the immigration of Indian Tamils 
became a significant problem for the country’s demography. Since 1952, the GoSL 
deployed the military to prevent illicit immigration and the military continued this role 
over two decades. The military’s deployment in illicit immigration prevention 
strengthened security but hindered the development of relevant law enforcement 
agencies. The Ceylon Citizenship Act No 18, of 1948, and the Indian and Pakistani 
Residents’ (Citizenship) Act No 34, of 1949, sought to define the people of Ceylon.118 
                                                 
114 The new government pursued the independence and signed the Defense and External Affairs 
Agreement with the British on November 11, 1947. Wilson notes that D.S. Senanayake came to the defense 
agreement to speed up the process of gaining independence and reducing the cost of defense. Wilson, 
Politics in Sri Lanka, 75. 
115 In 1947 general elections, the UNP secured 98 seats while LSSP got 28 and CP got 13. Wilson, 
Politics in Sri Lanka, 170. 
116 Ibid., 132. 
117 Since 1940s Ceylon was negotiating with India on the grant of citizenship to Indian Tamils and 
reached to different formulas; those policies fall short of implementation, however. De Silva, Managing 
Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies, 223. 
118 Citizenship could be by descent accorded to those peoples’ fathers or grandfathers born in Ceylon 
before September 1948 and if born after that date, father must be a citizen or qualified to be citizen. To 
become a citizen by registration, they must intend to be “ordinarily resident in the island.” Pakeman, 
Ceylon, 167.  
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Most legislators from minority communities, including Ceylon Tamils, voted for the bill; 
the Ceylon Indian Congress (CIC) and Sinhalese left-wing parties opposed the bill, 
however, because the restriction of citizenship to Indian Tamils reduced their 
constituency.119 
Subsequently in 1949, S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, a prominent figure in the Ceylon 
Tamil Congress (CTC), opposed the Citizenship Act and formed a more radical group, 
the Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK) or Federal Party (FP). The FP gave birth to the 
separatist ideology, while the left-wing parties were discontented with the UNP.120 The 
Citizenship Acts eventually led to the creation of a stateless population, the reduction of 
constituency of the left wing, and emergence of political opposition to unitary state 
structure. The Army embarked on a new role to assist the police to maintain law and 
order during the protests against the Citizenship Acts. Eventually, the Sinhala Only Act 
further distanced the FP from the ruling polity.  
2. The Sinhala Only Act and the Rise of Federalist Ideology: 1956–1972  
In the 1950s, linguistic nationalism became the basis for political mobilization, 
affecting both Sinhala and Tamil communities. Also, the other policies and associated 
discontent placed pressures on the state leading to the further increase of nationalism. As 
a result, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike formed the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP) and 
secured a comprehensive victory in the 1956 general elections.121 Prime Minister 
Bandaranaike promoted the concept of neutralism, staying away from the Cold War 
power blocs. Accordingly, it cancelled the Defense Agreement with the British in 1957 
                                                 
119 Disfranchisement reduced the Indian Tamils’ seats in the House from seven to none and Sinhalese 
representatives secured those seven seats since the 1952 elections. Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, 35; De 
Silva notes that Citizenship acts reduced the fear of Kandyn Sinhalese on electoral power of left-wing. De 
Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies, 155, 223. 
120 Bandarage notes that Ponnambalam, the leader of the CTC,  accused Chelvanayakam of attempting 
to foist on Tamil people and mislead the people because Arasu means an entity with absolute attributes of 
sovereignty. Also notes that ITAK’s demand for federal political structure and regional autonomy for 
Tamils is a quest for Tamil separatism. Asoka Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, 
Ethnicity, Political Economy (New York: iUniverse, Inc., 2009), 38, 39. 
121 The MEP was a coalition of the SLFP, Marxist LSSP, and pro-Sinhalese Bhasa Peramuna. Marxist 
LSSP also changed its stance from language parity to Sinhala only. Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in 
Sri Lanka, 42. 
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and took over the control of military bases in Sri Lanka; this changed the focus of the 
military from external roles and missions to internal security concerns. Darini 
Rajasingham-Senanayake posits that politicization and ethnicization of the military 
occurred after the taking over of the bases.122 
Meanwhile, the MEP enacted the Official Language Act in June 1956, making 
Sinhalese the official language; implementation of the Act, however, stretched over a 
period of five years until December 1960. In response, the FP organized Satyagraha 
(work stoppage) to oppose the Language Act, creating ethnic tensions that led to the 
Sinhalese and Tamil conflicts. The ethnic clashes affected civil and political society and 
rule of law, setting the background for the FP to promote its federalist ideology.  
The FP’s quest for federal provisions shaped the competition between the UNP 
and the SLFP. In August 1956, the FP held a convention and set out a list of Tamil 
demands, including a federal constitution giving autonomy to the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces.123 Prime Minister Bandaranaike entered a pact with the FP that provided for 
the devolution of power down to the district council. The pact also had the provision to 
allow both Sinhala and Tamil language administration in the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces. The UNP and Sinhalese nationalist groups opposed the Bandaranaike-
Chelvanayakam Pact, compelling the government to abandon it after violent riots in May 
and June 1958. The GoSL deployed the military to curb violence in addition to the police. 
Federalism versus the unitary structure of the state became the basis for conflict between 
the UNP and the SLFP, and the FP. 
The nationalist and federalist ideologies continued to shape the power politics in 
the 1960s. The new government under Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike continued 
the policies of the nationalization program and Sinhalization of the state. In 1961, the 
government enacted the “Sinhala Only Act” of 1956. The FP protested the Act through 
large-scale civil disobedience; in response, the government imposed a state of emergency 
in the Northern and Eastern Provinces in April 1961 and deployed the military to curb the 
                                                 
122 Senanayake, “Sri Lanka: Transformation of Legitimate Violence,” 300. 
123 De Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies,181–82. 
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protests. The deployment of the military to counter civil disobedience affected the rule of 
law, and civil and political societies. The military was displeased at its frequent 
deployment to solve internal political problems. It resulted in the abortive military coup 
in 1962, which will be discussed later in the chapter. In response, the government 
reduced the development of the military and commenced to increase the Sinhalese 
composition in the military.124 Despite the SLFP’s favor to the majority constituency of 
the country, the UNP won the 1965 general elections.125 The competition between the 
UNP and the SLFP, and the FP’s quest for federalism through electoral institutions, was a 
sign of political plurality.  
The FP’s federalist ideology and nationalism continued to shape politics. Amidst 
rising nationalism, the UNP government faced severe constraints in maintaining power. 
In 1965, the government also faced the threat of a suspected military coup; this led the 
government to reduce defense budget. The divisions within the government and pressure 
created by the opposition parties and Buddhist activists compelled Senanayake to 
abandon the Regional Council Bill.126 In 1968, the SLFP and its Marxist allies, the LSSP 
and CP, formed a Samagi Peramuna (UF) to compete with the UNP and won the 1970 
general elections.127 The UF’s Common Program undermined the Tamil minority’s 
demands, though it did address the grievances of the majority of the people through 
electoral institutions, which was important for democratic consolidation. The UF’s 
Common Program resulted in negative and positive effects toward democratization. 
                                                 
124 The ethnic composition of the Ceylon Light Infantry in 1960 was Sinhalese 44 percent, Tamil 32 
percent, Burgher 8 percent, Muslim 12 percent, and unknown 4 percent. Donald L. Horowitz, Coup 
Theories and Officers’ Motives: Sri Lanka in Comparative Perspective (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1980), 69.  
125 Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, 134. 
126 The SLFP-LSSP coalition in 1964 had promised the FP to implement the district councils; together 
with its Marxist allies, however it formed the opposition to the bill when proposed by the UNP. De Silva, 
Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies, 190, 192. 
127 The Common Program included the nationalization of private enterprise, restoration of the rice 
subsidy, provision of 750,000 jobs inclusive of 15,000 graduates, according Buddhism its “right place” 
while assuring other religions their “due rights,” non-alignment, and most importantly the establishment of 
a republic. Wilson states that the SLFP had moved further left from left-of-center with the common 
program. Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka, 147, 148. 
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The Common Program was politically successful but economically unsuccessful. 
As per the Common Program, the UF government initiated the mechanism to become a 
republic, which was a significant step toward democratic consolidation.128 On the 
economic side, the failure to nationalize the foreign commercial banks compelled the 
government to impose additional levies on some social services.129 Also, the government 
introduced a standardization system to deflect the charges of Tamil favoritism and 
provide a politically acceptable ratio of Sinhala and Tamil students’ entry into medicine, 
engineering and science faculties. Tamil politicians opposed the standardization 
mechanism because it reduced the benefits enjoyed by the Tamils during the colonial 
rule. Meanwhile, growing tensions among the Sinhalese youth on the state’s slow 
progress in addressing such social and economic issues provided the opportunity to the 
JVP for mobilizing educated Sinhala Buddhist youth for an insurrection in 1971.130  
3. The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) Insurrection: 1971 
The JVP’s insurrection severely affected democratic consolidation, breaking 
down the function of all the government’s institutions. The leader of the JVP, Rohana 
Wijeweera, publically ordered JVP members to take arms against the state, having 
criticized the UF coalition and capitalist system.131 On April 5, 1971, the JVP conducted 
a coordinated island-wide attack on police stations and government installations. The 
government enforced a state of emergency and a curfew, giving the military and the 
police a full range of arbitrary powers. The uprising ended within a short time in the face 
of the military onslaught.132 Different estimates suggest the number of fatalities from 
security personnel, JVP insurgents, and civilians ranged from 1,200 to 50,000.133 This 
                                                 
128 The FP members opposed the new constitution’s special status for Buddhism and reaffirmation of 
the Official Language Act of 1956, however, as attempts to subordinate the Tamil community. Bandarage, 
The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 64. 
129 Ibid., 149–50. 
130 De Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies, 241. 
131 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 56; De Silva notes, JVP insurrection was a 
“movement of the new left and the ultra-left against the established parties of the Marxist left, the LSSP, 
and CP and the populist SLFP.” De Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies, 241. 
132 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 56. 
133 Ibid., 57. 
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destruction caused by the insurgents, and the deployment of military with extra-judicial 
powers, severely affected the rule of law and civil and political societies. Later, Ceylon 
became a republic against the backdrop of the ethnic cleavage between the Sinhala and 
Tamil communities and the youth unrest resultant from political competition.   
B. SRI LANKAN REPUBLIC: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS FROM 1972 
TO 1990 
Sri Lanka became truly independent with the enactment of the republican 
constitution of 1972. The British had no more control of the country and it strengthened 
the sovereignty of the state. The constitution enactment became non-inclusive because 
the FP walked away from the constitutional committee. Also, the Tamils were conscious 
of being dominated by the majority Sinhalese. Thus, political competition among the 
UNP and the SLFP, the influence of left-wing parties and the FP resulted in critical 
events that affected the democratization process. This section discusses the emergence 
and development of the separatist insurgency, the escalation of Tamil separatist and JVP 
insurgencies, and the Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987.  
1. Becoming a Republic and Emergence of Separatist Insurgency: 1972–
1977 
The establishment of a republic had both positive and negative implications 
toward democratic consolidation. Ceylon became the Democratic Socialist Republic of 
Sri Lanka, a name linked to its Sinhalese heritage in the new constitution on May 22, 
1972.134 Becoming a republic enhanced the prospects for democratic consolidation, as 
the British had no more control over the country. On the other hand, it further increased 
the Tamils’ discontent because of their fear of Sinhalese domination. The Federal Party 
(FP) opposed the new constitution and presented a political program known as the Six-
                                                 
134 De Silva states that new republican constitution was the “critical starting point of a new phase in 
ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, a dangerously destabilizing phase which saw the triumph of the linguistic 
nationalism of the Singhalese consolidate through a new political and constitutional framework, but 
confronting the new Tamil version it taken to its logical conclusion on the form of a separatist movement,” 
De Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies, 240. 
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Point Plan.135 Also, the two main Tamil political parties joined together to oppose the 
constitution and formed the Tamil United Front (TUF).136 The government was 
determined not to yield to the pressures of the FP. According to De Silva, the 
government’s stance pushed “the FP away from the moderate program embodied in the 
Six Point Plan, to a full-blooded insistence on separatism.”137 Thus, the state became free 
from British influence, but the TUF politically challenged the state’s unitary structure by 
separatism.  
The FP’s inability to fulfill the Tamils’ desires gave rise to the armed struggle for 
separatism.138 Tamil militants increased gang robberies and the murder of police and 
Tamil government servants. The first political assassination of the Tamils’ separatist 
struggle was Alfred Duraiappah, the Mayor of Jaffna, by Prabhakaran in 1975. At the 
same time, the TUF changed its name to the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF); it 
adopted a convention commonly known as the Vaddukoddai Resolution claiming a 
separate state, the Tamil Eelam.139 The Tamil New Tigers (TNT), which started in 1972, 
became the LTTE under Velupillai Prabhakaran in 1976. The TULF’s separatist claim in 
their manifesto for the 1977 general elections posed a formidable hybrid political and 
military threat to the state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.140  
Meanwhile, the governments’ economic policies, designed to please its rural 
majority and the left, extended its control to every sector of the economy, including 
foreign-owned plantations. The economic growth rate fell below 3 percent while 
                                                 
135 The plan included language parity for Tamil with Sinhalese as official language, extension of 
citizenship right to Indian Tamils who had settled in Sri Lanka, equality of all religions, constitutional 
guarantee of equal rights, abolition of untouchability, and decentralized structure of government as the 
basis of a participatory democracy. De Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies, 257–
258.  
136 De Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies, 256. 
137 Ibid., 258. The other factors contributed to this transformation include: “the role of the educated 
unemployed; the significance of a new policy on university admissions in radicalizing politics in the Jaffna 
Peninsula; the transformation of the security forces and the police from impartial peacekeeping force into 
paradigms of ethnic soldiers and policemen, and finally the linkage between the politics of the Jaffna 
Peninsula and the politics of Tamil Nadu.” 
138 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 65–66. 
139 Ibid., 66–71. 
140 Ibid., 72. 
 33 
unemployment rose to almost one quarter of the labor force in 1976.141 Government 
policies hindered the creation of an environment that was conducive to nourishing an 
institutionalized economic society. Although this economic downfall connects to the 
global economic downturn, the people of the South lost faith in the UF government. The 
Army gained a role in national development and food production and engaged in farming 
until 1976, helping to mitigate the economic burdens.142 Subsequently, the UNP gained a 
massive victory in 1979, securing better than a five-sixths majority, while the TULF won 
massively to become the opposition. For the first time, the left-wing parties were unable 
to win a single seat, while the SLFP secured only 8 seats.143 Thus, the left-wing parties 
lost their bargaining power and could not recover until the 1990s. The requests of the 
Tamils became the main concern for the new government.   
2. Development of the Separatist Insurgency: 1977–1982 
Prime Minister Jayewardene’s second republican constitution of 1978 attempted 
to meet the Tamils’ requests. The prime minister established a presidential form of 
government under the new constitution. Several legislative and administrative measures 
were helpful to meet some of the long-standing Tamil grievances, such as constitutional 
provisions for the extension of fundamental rights of Indian-origin noncitizens, 
recognizing Tamil as a national language, and assuring the rights of all religions.144 The 
constitution introduced proportional representation in the legislature, giving minorities a 
strong bargaining position.145 The abolition of the language-based ethnic quotas and the 
introduction of new politically and academically viable policies based on district-merits 
was a bold political decision in the face of opposition from the Sinhala majority and the 
                                                 
141 De Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies, 241; Bandarage, The Separatist 
Conflict in Sri Lanka, 58. 
142 Brian Blodgett, Sri Lanka’s Military: The Search for a Mission, 1949–2004 (San Diego: Aventine 
Press, 2004), 66. 
143 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 73. 
144 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 92. 
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SLFP.146 It was also a democratic move as the TULF had power to affect the 
government’s decisions.  
Despite the newly adopted conciliatory policies towards the Tamil community, 
the TULF continued its radical stance.147 Initially, the government attempted to handle 
the eruptions of communal violence under normal laws.148 Later, the continuation of 
violence compelled the government to extend the laws prohibiting the militant 
organizations. The normal legal and police procedures were ineffective for the state to 
meet the challenge posed by the militants.149 The most significant as well as 
controversial one was the Prevention of Terrorism Act of July 1979. The GoSL declared 
a state of emergency until December 31, 1979, and tasked the Army to stamp out 
terrorism in Jaffna.150 The deployment of the military under the prevention of terrorism 
act (PTA) led to the restriction of people’s freedom of movement and gathering, as well 
as arrests of suspects; it severely affected the rule of law, and civil and political society, 
in the North.151  
At the same time, the liberalized economy helped to develop the institutionalized 
economy, though disparities in the distribution of benefits increased the animosity of the 
Tamils. The government began economic liberalization due to pressures from the IMF 
and the World Bank. The welfare expenditure got less focus while infrastructure 
investment and foreign direct investment liberalization increased; it facilitated the labor 
market’s flexibility, eliminating the link between ethnicity and university admission. 
According to Biziouras, the UNP’s need to outbid the SLFP caused it to distribute 
selective incentives to its majority constituency, disregarding the allocation of benefits to 
                                                 
146 De Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies, 306. 
147 De Silva states that TULF was unwilling to or unable to move away from its separatist campaign 
propagated during general elections of 1977. De Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic 
Societies, 305. 
148 Ibid., 326. 
149 Ibid. 
150 De Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies, 331. 
151 The PTA allows law enforcement agencies to detain suspects without trial for up to 18 months and 
bring the suspects to trial based on confessions inadmissible under normal law of the state. Bandarage, The 
Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 101.  
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Tamil areas. Consequently, the inability of Tamil political leaders to provide benefits to 
their brethren led to radical political demands and violence.152 
The UNP’s attempt to continue power through a referendum, instead of general 
elections, further increased the discontent of Tamils. Jayawardene won the presidential 
election in 1982 and held a referendum to extend the tenure of previously elected 
members of the parliament in December 1982. The government won the referendum, 
despite the SLFP’s and the TULF’s opposition.153 The TULF was distressed about not 
having by-elections in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, where the government got 
worse results than other areas.154 Asoka Bandarage states that the UNP government lost 
its legitimacy and faith of both Sinhala and Tamil youth due to the fraudulent 
referendum, giving rise to violence.155 The Tamils became further discontented with the 
government due to the failure of electoral institutions to address their political problems.  
3. Escalation of Insurgencies: 1983–1990 
The loss of faith in the government’s legitimacy paved the way to escalate the 
Tamil terrorists’ insurgency. Tamil militants organized to wage war to form a separate 
state, Tamil Eelam, in the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka. On July 23, 
1983, the LTTE ambushed a Sri Lanka Army convoy in Jaffna and killed 13 soldiers; this 
began the Eelam War I. According to Bandarage, pro-government gangs turned the anti-
government feelings of the Sinhalese gathered at the funeral of the soldiers into anti-
Tamil feelings; it led to an outbreak of arson and the murder of Tamils, commonly called 
the Black July riots. Violence continued for several days and resulted in the killing of 
hundreds, and the displacement and unemployment of tens of thousands. Two days after 
the eruption of violence, President Jayawardene declared a curfew on July 25, 1983 and 
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deployed the military to terminate the riots.156 Although many Sinhalese did not tolerate 
the riots and supported the victims, the Tamils’ sense of insecurity and distrust of the 
Sinhalese continued to remain. On the other hand, continued terrorist attacks, such as the 
massacres of Sinhalese villagers in Welioya in 1984, Buddhist pilgrims in Anuradhapura 
in 1985, and Buddhist monks in Arantalawa in 1987, increased the Sinhalese suspicion of 
Tamils.157 Thus, ethnicity became the basis for organizing of civil and political societies 
due to increased cleavage between the Sinhalese and the Tamils.  
The subsequent actions of the government further intensified the situation. The 
government placed the blame for the riots on the JVP and banned it; the JVP went 
underground for covert politics. The sixth amendment to the constitution outlawed the 
support for separatism within Sri Lanka; the TULF leadership refused to swear an oath to 
safeguard the unitary structure of the country and fled to Tamil Nadu.158 The political 
exclusion of radical political parties gave an opportunity for Tamil militants to fill the 
political vacuum, monopolizing the Tamil political agenda.159 The Tamil Nadu 
government pressed the Indian government to intervene in Sri Lankan affairs due to the 
sympathy toward co-ethnic and co-religionist Tamils in northern Sri Lanka.   
4. The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord: 1987 
India intervened in the Sri Lankan conflict, giving rise to an insurgency in the 
south. Indian intervention led to both the resurrections of the JVP insurgency and the 
LTTE’s violence by the end of the 1980s. After the 1983 riots, Tamil militant 
organizations mushroomed and intensified attacks on the military and civilians. The 
Indian-mediated peace attempt in 1985 did not succeed, due to the rigid stance of both 
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sides.160 To re-establish government control in Jaffna, the Sri Lankan military conducted 
a military campaign, Operation Liberation, in 1987.161 The operation was successful in 
eliminating the separatist terrorists; the government had to call off the operation, 
however, due to the pressure resultant from Indian intervention in airdropping food in 
Jaffna.162 Despite heavy internal opposition, President “Jayawardene signed the Indo-Sri 
Lanka Accord on July 29, 1987.”163  
According to the agreement, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was to 
disarm the Tamil militants and provide security in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. 
Also, the 13
th
 Amendment of 1987 to the Sri Lankan Constitution established provincial 
councils, decentralizing power; the Northern and Eastern Provinces were merged to form 
a single province.164 The Northern and Eastern Provinces Provincial Council, established 
in October 1987, and the Eelam Peoples’ Revolutionary Front (EPRLF) established the 
provincial government. The IPKF took over the security duties in the newly formed 
Northern and Eastern Province. Meanwhile, the LTTE abrogated the pledges given and 
resorted to fighting the IPKF. The LTTE engaged in attacking the IPKF and other 
militant groups to be the sole representative of the Tamils in the struggle for the Eelam. 
At the same time, the JVP resurrection escalated in the south.  
The JVP resorted to violence to overthrow the government in 1987. The JVP, 
radicalized by the political exclusion, was able to take advantage of public opposition to 
the Indian intervention.165 The government was compelled to bring back the military 
from the Northern and Eastern Provinces and deployed them island-wide to fight the JVP 
insurgency.166 The JVP’s violent campaign brought down civil administration and rule of 
law.167 The economy collapsed, and by the end of 1988, there was fear that the JVP 
                                                 
160 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 125–26. 
161 Ibid., 130. 
162 K.M. De Silva, Sri Lanka and the Defeat of the LTTE (New Delhi: Penguin Group, 2012), 67. 
163 Ibid., 132. 
164 Ibid., 133. 
165 Ibid.,139. 
166 Ibid., 140. 
167 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 141. 
 38 
would come to power.168 The government granted almost unlimited powers to the 
military and the police to fight the JVP.169 A number of paramilitary organizations such 
as the Black Cats and Green Tigers emerged to fight the JVP.170 The second JVP ended 
in November 1989 leaving some 40,000 dead, although some estimated a higher number 
of 60,000 deaths.171 Meanwhile, the LTTE was exhausted in the fighting with the IPKF 
and sought to gain breathing space with the Peace Talks with the Sri Lankan government.  
The peace talks provided the LTTE the opportunity to reorganize in the face of 
the challenge from the IPKF.172 In the presidential election, Ranasinghe Premadasa, who 
strongly opposed the Indian intervention, became the President. President Premadasa 
wanted to send the IPKF back to settle the South and to negotiate a political settlement 
with the LTTE.173 The government held peace talks with the LTTE in October 1989. 
When the IPKF withdrew in March 1990, the LTTE strengthened its combat power with 
the arms and equipment left by the IPKF. The Sri Lankan military was confined to a few 
bases held during the IPKF period. In June 1990, LTTE started the Second Eelam War by 
killing 600 unarmed policemen who were surrendered on the government’s 
instructions.174 The Northern and Eastern Provinces became a state-within-a-state under 
the LTTE’s totalitarian control, undermining the democracy (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1.  The Area Claimed for the Tamil Eelam (as of 2006).175 
 
 
The political developments resulted in frequent deployment of the military in 
different missions from 1948 to 1990. These missions ranged from non-military tasks 
such as maintenance of essential services, construction works, agriculture tasks, and 
police duties such as riot control and illicit immigration prevention to counterinsurgency 
missions. The military’s deployment in non-military tasks helped the GoSL to fill the 
vacuum in bureaucracy and to maintain the economy, but it affected the development of 
civilian bureaucracy to advance the GoSL’s plans. Also, the military’s deployment in a 
police role ensured security, but undermined the development of the capacities of law 
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enforcement agencies such as the police and the Department of Immigration and 
Emigration. Also, it affected the freedom of civil and political societies because the 
military acted under the emergency regulations. The military’s counterinsurgency 
missions such as fighting the JVP and Tamil separatism were successful in maintaining 
the state’s sovereignty providing security. It severely affected all the arenas of democratic 
consolidation, however, because the emergency regulations and the PTA restricted the 
oversight of military while providing the military relatively greater autonomy and 
impunity. In this context, the next section discusses the effects of the military’s 
deployment in internal missions toward CMR from 1948 to 1990.  
C. CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS FROM 1948 TO 1990 
Sri Lanka’s civil-military relations transformed from colonial to democratic 
relations after independence. As discussed previously, the high degree of 
constitutionalism maintained by the elected leaders was successful in maintaining control 
of the military. Also, Sri Lanka’s military never had a martial tradition and continued the 
colonial legacies for decades. The successive governments used the military to solve the 
outcomes of their ineffective policies. Although the military was not satisfied by the 
internal roles, its professional norms compelled it to be subservient to the civil 
authorities. This section discusses the developments of democratic civilian control and 
the effectiveness of the military during the period.  
1. Democratic Civilian Control of the Military 
The democratic civilian control established and strengthened by the successive 
constitutions. The GoSL frequently deployed the military in different non-military roles 
and it resulted in tensions between the military and the civilian leaders. The civilian 
control of the military was strong enough to manage those situations successfully. 
Following paragraphs discusses the developments of institutional control mechanisms, 
oversight, and the professionalism of the military. 
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a. Institutional Control Mechanisms 
Since 1948, GoSL maintained heavy institutional control over the military.176 The 
successive governments deployed the military in “firefighter” and “police officer” macro 
roles and, therefore, exercised greater executive civilian control over the military.177 
Under the Soulbury Constitution, the prime minster maintained the control over the 
military as the minister of defense and external affairs.178 The Governor General was the 
Commander-in-Chief of the military; the prime minister, however, had the power to 
decide over the use of the military.179 The prime minister deciding the career of the 
officers authorized the enlistment, commission, promotions, and retirement of the 
military officers; it ensured greater civilian control over the military. The subsequent 
constitutions continued the provisions for executive civilian control over the military. 
The first republican constitution of 1972 strengthened the executive civilian 
control over the military. It might be a result of requirements to continue the military 
deployment “firefighter role” and to prevent any military coup. The president, who was 
an appointee of the prime minister, had emergency powers including declaration of war 
and peace. The prime minister had the powers to persuade the president to declare a state 
of emergency, however. Also, the prime minister had the authority to advice the president 
on important public service appointments including the chiefs of the Army, Navy, Air 
Force, and police.180 Thus, the decision on careers of the military officers remained with 
the executive, ensuring civilian control over the military.   
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The second republican constitution of 1978 further strengthened executive 
civilian control over the military. It might be a result of the suspicion on the military’s 
political neutrality.181 The directly elected executive president was the Commander in 
Chief of the Armed Forces and the Minister of Defense. Also, the president had the 
authority to appoint public service appointments and the chiefs of the Army, Navy, Air 
Force, and police. Moreover, Article 55(6) of the Constitution declares that the Army, 
Navy, and Air Force officers are not public service officers, keeping the military directly 
under the chief executive’s control.182 The 1978 Constitution that asserts greater civilian 
control in comparison with the other institutional mechanisms continues to be in force to 
this date. 
The military acts stipulate the role and missions of the military. These acts assign 
defender, firefighter, and police officer macro roles to the military. Also, the military’s 
micro roles change at the behest of the successive governments to legitimize the 
deployment of the military in non-military tasks. The military acts of 1949 and 1950 
legitimized the state’s deployment of the military for internal missions. The acts of all 
three services established the military mission as the “defense of Ceylon in time of war or 
for the prevention or suppression of any rebellion, insurrection or other civil disturbance 
in the country.”183 The Army’s mission also included the “performance of non-military 
duties necessary for the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the 
community on the order of the Governor-General.”184 An amendment to the Army Act in 
the late 1950s included the employment of the Army in non-military duties as the 
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government intended to use military engineer units for infrastructure development 
projects.185 In addition, as Blodgett states, “when the government declared a state of 
emergency all three services were called in aid to the civil power.”186Thus, the military 
acts legitimize its deployment in a firefighter role and other non-military missions to aid 
civil powers, at the behest of the civilian government.187 
The institutional mechanisms facilitated the civilians to exercise control and 
oversight over the military. Development of organizational mechanism for oversight was 
essential due to the military’s deployment in “firefighter” and “police officer” roles. The 
Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the National Security Council (NSC) were the principal 
mechanism of control and oversight of the military. The MOD is responsible to 
formulate, coordinate, and execute the policies related to national security and routine 
administrative matters of the armed forces. The MOD exercises the control and oversight 
over the military through review of annual reports, management of defense procurements, 
allocation of budgets, authorizing enlistments, promotions, service extensions, and 
retirements of officers. The Secretary of Defense is the main point of contact of all 
service commanders on any matter related to defense. Due to this reason, since the late 
1970s, retired military officers have held this post. The GoSL established the Ministry of 
National Security in 1984 to coordinate the military and the police on counterinsurgency 
and counter-terrorist activities.188   
The NSC, the executive body of the GoSL, was informally in existence from the 
late 1970s is responsible to maintain national security with the authority to direct the 
armed forces.189 The Prime Minister, later the executive President, who was the head of 
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state and Commander-in-Chief, is the chairperson of the NSC. The NSC includes the 
Deputy Minister of Defense (if the portfolio is available), the secretaries to the president 
and MOD, the service commanders, the Inspector General of the Police, and the directors 
of the intelligence services. All the security-related matters are discussed in the NSC and 
the President makes the decisions.190 Both the MOD and the NSC evolved the 
institutional control and oversight over the military with the change of military missions 
from time to time.  
b. Oversight of the Military 
There was a limited oversight of the military.191 The constitutions of 1946, 1972, 
and 1978 keep the military under institutional, judicial, and legislative control and 
oversight. The Fundamental Rights (FR) guaranteed in the 1972 Constitution were more 
strongly and genuinely entrenched in the 1978 constitution.192 Citizens could file FR 
violation charges against the military personnel on their official functions. Emergency 
regulations and the PTA provided impunity for the military personnel, however, thus 
restricting oversight. Although the cabinet of Ministers has the oversight over the military 
through budget appropriation, executive control limited the legislature’s oversight. The 
media and civil society organizations, and NGOs, also had a limited oversight of the 
military through criticizing the military activities. During the 1971 and 1987–1990 JVP 
insurrections, however, the restriction enforced by the GoSL and the intimidations 
strained the oversight by the media and civil society organizations. In addition, the 
GoSL’s perception that criticizing the military was an impediment to national security 
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compelled the media and civil society organizations to restrain themselves from 
overseeing and criticizing military activities.193    
c. Professional Norms 
There were constraints on the professional norms institutionalized in the military 
since their commencement.194 The political developments amidst the competition 
between the UNP and the SLFP led to politicizing the military while ethnic tensions led 
to ethnicizing the military. Since 1957, the nationalization of the military took place as an 
effort by the political elite to mitigate the ethnic imbalances created by the British and to 
decolonize the military culture.195 The decolonizing process led to politicization of the 
military because consecutive UNP and SLFP governments continued to politicize the 
military by allowing partisan elements to come into the military, thus dividing the 
military on political allegiances. Also, the 1962 coups created religious suspicion, as a 
majority of those involved in the coup were Christians.196 In response, Prime Minister 
Mrs. Bandaranaike increased the Sinhalese Buddhist composition of the officer corps, 
relying on ethno-religious-elite loyalty (see Tables 2 and 3). This further eroded the 
military’s professionalism as an impartial force.197 
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Table 2. The Ceylon Light Infantry Regiment Officers’ Ethnic 
Composition: 1949–1974 (as a Percentage of Total Officers).198 
Ethnicity 1949,51–1954 1956–1960 1963–1969 1972–1974 
Sinhalese 55 44 96 88 
Tamil 18 32 4 12 
Burgher 20 8 0 0 
Muslim 7 12 0 0 
Unknown 0 4 0 0 
 
Table 3. The Ceylon Light Infantry Regiment Officers’ Religious 
Composition: 1949–1974 (as a Percentage of Total Officers).199 
Religion 1949–1954 1956–1960 1963–1969 
Buddhist 34 40 89 
Christian 59 36 7 
Hindu 0 8 0 
Muslim 7 12 0 
Unknown 0 4 4 
 
In addition, the civilian leaders used the military to solve problems resulting from 
their policies. For example, in 1955, Prime Minister Sir John raised two Sinhalese 
infantry units to support the government due to the concerns over civil unrest.200 Later, 
Prime Minister Bandaranaike disbanded the two units; he approved the establishment of 
regular and volunteer battalions with technical skills, however, to deploy during the 
breakdown of essential services due to strikes.201 Thus, military professionalism began to 
erode due to politicization, ethnicization, and deployment to solve political problems. The 
military’s dissatisfaction over its use by the government led to the 1962 military coup. 
The abortive military coup in 1962 and the suspected coup attempt in 1966 
severely affected the military professionalism. The coup challenged the professional 
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military ethos on recognizing the supremacy of elected civilian leadership.202 The 1962 
plot was the work of a group of 24 high-ranking Army and police officers with four 
civilians to overthrow Mrs. Bandaranaike’s government. According to Horowitz, the 
officers involved in the 1962 coup perceived emergency duties as civilian or police work, 
and strikes and ethnic riots as the product of the government’s own lack or resolve. They 
viewed the military as helping the government out of troubles of its own making.203 In 
1966, the GoSL arrested former Army Commander Major General A.R. Udugama on 
charges of a coup against the newly elected UNP government; the accused was acquitted 
after the trial, however. Although the coup members did not have an intention to establish 
a military regime, the subsequent governments were suspicious of the military’s 
professionalism.  
The military remained subservient to the elected civilian government, however. 
The military recognized that in a democracy the will of the people as represented by the 
government in power was supreme. Several events highlight the military’s subservience 
to the elected leadership. Although most of the military personnel were rural youth, only 
very few military personnel engaged in the JVP insurrection in 1971. Also, during 
Operation Liberation in 1987, the military was successful in surrounding the LTTE 
leadership, but at the behest of the GoSL the military abandoned the mission just at the 
moment of victory. In addition, during the JVP resurrection in 1987–1990, the military 
remained obedient to the elected government even in the face of mass public opposition 
to Indian intervention; also, the military’s support to the JVP was negligible.204 Further, 
during 1989–90, the military was obedient to the elected president despite the claims that 
the president provided arms to the military’s formidable enemy, the LTTE.205  
                                                 
202 Young asserts, “Military professionalism is the systematic creation of a class of people for whom 
war is a profession and who pursue general and sub specializations in the art and science of conflict.” 
Young, “Military Professionalism in a Democracy,” 19. 
203 Horowitz posits that the coup respondents had personal, familial, and factional motives that led to 
the corporate motive of fulfillment of needs of the organization. Horowitz, Coup Theories and Officers’ 
Motives, 111–112.  
204 Blodgett points to the adverse effect of obedience, stating, “after the JVP threatened the families of 
the soldiers, the Army became a killing tool of the President—killing anyone the soldiers thought might be 
a JVP supporter.” Blodgett, Sri Lanka’s Military, 95. 
205 Bandarage, The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, 152. 
 48 
The roles performed by the military significantly contributed to the development 
of training. The training resulted in the increase of professionalism through the 
development of expertise, ability to perform essential duties, responsibility and 
corporateness. Also, training directly affected the military effectiveness. In the late 1940s 
and 1950s, the military received training from the British.206 Frequent deployment in 
anti-trade unionists’ activities and police role did nothing to develop combat skills, 
however, but denied the time to do jungle warfare training.207 After the coup attempts in 
the 1960s, the GoSL restricted military training and the military did not get time train in 
jungle warfare because the GoSL deployed them in national development projects.208  
 After the 1971 JVP insurrection, however, the GoSL paid attention to develop 
military capabilities and as a result military training improved. A large number of officers 
got training in India and Pakistan.209 All three services established their own military 
training academies to train officer cadets and training centers to develop specialized skills 
as per service requirements. Also, the economic liberalization in 1978 positively affected 
the development of military establishments opening up to new technology.210 In 1981, 
the government established the Kotelawala Defence Academy (KDA) to train officer 
cadets of the three services; it helped to develop the corporateness among the three 
services.211 The training tremendously increased after the escalation of the Tamil 
separatist insurgency in 1983. The Army got training on urban warfare and 
counterinsurgency. Pakistan provided counterinsurgency training for 38 instructors. Also, 
the Army conducted Tamil language courses for the units deploy in the Northern 
province.212   
                                                 
206 83 Officer Cadets received training at the British Sandhurst Academy from 1950 to1960. Blodgett, 
Sri Lanka’s Military, 37. 
207 Ibid., 39. 
208 Blodgett posits that soldiers conducted the “plough shares for guns campaign in which soldiers 
farmed instead of being trained for war.” Ibid., 55. 
209 Sri Lanka Army, 50 Years On, 222. 
210 Ibid., 290. 
211 Ibid., 333. 
212 Blodgett, Sri Lanka’s Military, 94. 
 49 
2. Effectiveness of the Military 
Newly independent Sri Lankan military lacked the effectiveness due to the 
absence of martial traditions and became a ceremonial force. The Defense Agreement 
with the British provided the military the opportunity to gain training and equipment 
while following the British doctrines. After the cancellation of that agreement, the 
progress of the military’s effectiveness was slow. Also, the internal focus of the military 
and its frequent deployment in non-military duties affected its effectiveness. The 
following paragraphs discuss the development of plans and structures of the military and 
the allocation of resources for it.    
a. Plans: Doctrines and Strategies 
The military’s doctrines and strategies evolved with the changing missions.213 
The military followed the British doctrines on conventional warfare, internal security, 
and counter-revolutionary warfare; British military doctrines become the guidelines for 
the Sri Lankan military to date. The cancellation of the Defense and External Affairs 
Agreement with the British in 1957 officially ended the military’s external mission..214 
Then the doctrine changed to jungle and anti-guerilla operations. After the failed military 
coups, the doctrine changed to resort to guerilla warfare in case of an external threat.215  
 Consequently, in the 1970s, the military focused the doctrines on counter guerilla/
insurgency and internal security based on British doctrine. Since 1983, the doctrinal focus 
of the Army and the Navy changed while the Air Force remained with the main role of 
transport and reconnaissance.216 The Army’s focus was on “high intensity internal 
security operations, low intensity counter revolutionary operations, and counter terrorist 
operations with Special Forces and low intensity conventional operations.”217 The Navy 
                                                 
213 According to Bruneau and Matei, plans, structures (interagency coordination and cooperation), and 
resources contribute to the military’s effectiveness in fulfilling the six roles and missions described in 
Chapter I. Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” 33. 
214 Blodgett posits that frequent performance of non-military duties set the stage for an inward-
focused military. Blodgett, Sri Lanka’s Military, 25–30. 
215 Ibid., 35, 51. 
216 Ibid., 
217 Ibid., 89. 
 50 
began to focus on protecting the coastline using larger ships.218 After the escalation of 
separatist insurgency, all three services continued to develop their tactics to counter the 
Tamil militants’ activities.   
b. Organizational Structures 
The organizational structures of the military gradually developed in accordance 
with the performed roles and missions. The independence in 1948 led to the creation of 
the Ceylonese military, transforming the British Royal military into Ceylonese military 
forces.219The Army and Navy mobilized the former Ceylon Defense Force (CDF) and 
Ceylon Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (CRNVR); the Air Force, however, began as a 
new service.220 The creation of the Army, Navy and Air Force took place respectively in 
1949, 1950, and 1951 under specific government acts.221 Since the inception, enlistment 
of officers and recruitment of other ranks to the military was on a volunteer basis and this 
practice continues to date. The establishment of new operational, administrative, and 
training organizations for all three armed services took place. For instance, by 1978, the 
Army expanded to operate from five operational commands.222 When the military 
strength increased, the GoSL established a Joint Operations Center (JOC) to coordinate 
the counterinsurgency operational activities of the military, the police, and intelligence 
agencies.223  
c. Commitment of Resources 
The commitment of resources to the military increased during the period. The 
GoSL increased the allocation of manpower and defense expenditure initially after the 
JVP insurrection in 1971 and then after 1983. Thus, the roles performed by the military 
and the intensity of the counterinsurgency operations against Tamil separatist insurgents 
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became the basis for the GoSL to increase resource commitment. Since 1971, the military 
strength gradually increased and rose from 20,000 in 1983 to 50,000 in 1988.224 Also, the 
GoSL mobilized the Army Volunteer Force after 1971. Table 4 shows the increase of the 
Army’s strength. The Army was mostly Sinhalese during the 1980s, with few Tamils and 
Muslims. There was the ongoing communication gap, as most Sinhalese soldiers were not 
conversant with the Tamil language and Tamils tended to look at the largely Sinhala 
Army as an occupying force. It affected the military’s effectiveness when conducting 
operations in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. 
Table 4.  The Strength of the Army: 1978–1989 (Selected Years).225 
 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1989 
Actual Strength 10,309 11,905 14,217 14,458 31,455 38,525 45,373 
 
The defense budget increase because of the escalation of separatist insurgency 
contributed to the enhancement of the military effectiveness. The defense budget 
allocation steadily increased until 1982 and significantly increased after 1983, as shown 
in Table 5. The increased budget provided the military the opportunity to increase 
strength, develop infrastructure, and improve training, and most importantly, to equip to 
fulfill the responsibilities. The allocated budget, however, was never sufficient to fulfil 
the needs to become a professional military organization, particularly due to lack of 
infrastructure and transport. Also, technological development proceeded slowly.  
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Table 5.  Defense Budget of Sri Lanka: 1978–1989 
(Selected Years).226 
 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1989 
Actual Expenditure  
(Sri Lankan Rupees billion) 
.540 .827 .908 1,870 5,300 6,500 5,800 
 
Moreover, equipping of the military led to the creation of an international variable 
for the CMR. Sri Lanka produces no warlike material and totally depends on other 
nations for obtaining military equipment. Since the 1970s, the military used World War 
II-vintage weapons and equipment brought from the British.227 After 1971, Sri Lanka 
received military assistance from Australia, Britain, China, India, Pakistan, the U.S., and 
the USSR. After 1983, however, primarily China and Pakistan were the suppliers of 
military hardware. Thus, the external military hardware supplying nations became a 
variable in Sri Lankan CMR because obtaining military equipment from foreign nations 
depends on the GoSL’s relations with those nations.   
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY  
Since independence in 1948, Sri Lankan political developments affected the 
democratization process. Independence from the British marked the country’s transition 
to democracy with continuing historical and colonial legacies. The two major political 
parties, the UNP and the SLFP, engaged in a power competition through providing 
selective incentives to the constituency. Also, the policies of successive governments 
eventually resulted in the 1971 and 1987–1990 JVP insurrections and the separatist Tamil 
insurgency since the 1970s. By the 1990s, the LTTE gained defacto control over a 
considerable area of the Northern and Eastern provinces after the withdrawal of the IPKF. 
Throughout the period, both the UNP and the SLFP governments deployed the military in 
firefighter and police roles; this created mostly negative effects toward the civil and 
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political societies and the rule of law. During the insurgencies, however, deployment of 
the military helped to maintain the state’s sovereignty.  
Meanwhile, the deployment of the military in internal missions affected the CMR. 
The military was under democratic civilian control, and its effectiveness gradually 
improved. Other than the two coup attempts in 1962 and 1966, there were no significant 
constraints to the CMR. The institutional control mechanisms such as the MOD and the 
NSC steadily increased. The executive civilian control consolidated its strength with the 
1978 Constitution. Oversight of the military was relatively weak, however, due to lack of 
legislative oversight and centralized executive power. The politicization and ethnicization 
of the military eroded the military’s professionalism as an impartial force; the 
counterinsurgency operations against Tamil separatism increased the military 
professionalism, however, particularly training and military effectiveness. The military 
strength and defense budget allocation significantly increased, giving the opportunity for 
the military to develop its capabilities. The total dependency on foreign nations for 
acquisition of military hardware created an external variable for the CMR, however. In 
addition, according to De Silva, since the 1960s “the country began moving from being a 
virtually demilitarized entity to one that was being militarized at a level unmatched in the 
whole of South Asia.”228 In this context, the next chapter discusses the democratic 
consolidation and CMR during the conflict between the government and the LTTE from 
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III. DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION 
AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: 1990–2009 
The LTTE’s activities after 1990 severely affected Sri Lanka’s democratization. 
As shown in the previous chapter, by June 1990 the LTTE had gained control over 
considerable areas in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. In response, successive GoSL 
used the military to maintain law and order in the areas that were under the domination of 
the LTTE and forced the LTTE to sit at the negotiating table. Despite the destruction 
resulting from the high intensity conflict, the “real GDP growth averaged 4.6 percent 
annually” until 1998.229 The political power alternatively shifted between the UNP- and 
the SLFP-led coalitions. The GoSL’s increased reliance on the military to maintain the 
sovereignty improved the CMR, particularly the military effectiveness; military activities 
under the emergency law and the PTA affected civil and political societies and rule of 
law, however. Thus, the CMR influenced democratic consolidation in both positive and 
negative ways. This chapter discusses the status of democratic consolidation and the 
CMR during the high intensity conflict phase from 1990 until June 2009; it sets forth the 
background that is essential to examine the effects of military deployment in post-conflict 
reconstruction toward CMR and thus toward democratic consolidation. The discussion 
focuses on the political developments that shaped the military missions and the effects of 
those military missions toward democratic consolidation and the CMR.  
A. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS FROM 1990 TO 2009  
It is not a surprise that the rise of the LTTE and its extended domination in the 
Northern and Eastern Provinces, as a state-within-a-state, affected the political 
developments during the period. In the early 1990s, the state lost control over the 
monopoly of the use of force in a considerable area of the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces to the LTTE. The group’s domination in the Northern and Eastern Provinces 
undermined the possibility for democratic consolidation. The military contained the 
LTTE from further expansion of its control, however, while simultaneously expanding 
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the GoSL’s control over the territory through military operations. Thus, re-establishment 
of the GoSL’s administration over the LTTE-dominated areas became the main factor 
that influenced political developments in the country. This section discusses the critical 
political developments during the period: Eelam War II and the rise of the LTTE, Eelam 
War III and regaining control of Jaffna Peninsula, and Eelam War IV and defeat of the 
LTTE 2006–2009.  
1. The Eelam War II and the Rise of the LTTE 
The LTTE’s rise affected the state’s sovereignty, an important prerequisite for 
democratic consolidation.230 The group began the Eelam War II and gained control in the 
newly amalgamated Northern and Eastern Provinces Province after abrogating the peace 
agreement in June 1990.231 Although the military operations brought the Eastern 
Province under government control by 1992, the LTTE continued its influence in the 
east, operating from several remote jungle bases. Meanwhile, the military gained control 
over the islands of the Jaffna Peninsula; by 1992, however, the GoSL’s control was 
limited to a few strategic bases in the Northern Province: Palaly, Elephant Pass, 
Mullaitivu, Islands, and Pooneryn. The conflict between the GoSL and the LTTE to 
expand their control in the Northern and Eastern Provinces Province became a main 
factor that affected the state’s sovereignty. The state continued to use the military to 
regain control over the region.  
Meanwhile, the Tamil diaspora gained momentum and increased its support of the 
LTTE’s separatist terrorism. By the early 1990s, the LTTE began to open front offices in 
more than 40 countries and eventually the Tamil diaspora became the main source for the 
LTTE to gain resources and legitimacy for the armed struggle.232 The ideological and 
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financial support extended by the Tamil diaspora was the main factor that enabled the 
LTTE to fight a protracted battle. Kumar Rupesinghe states that “by the late 1990s, the 
LTTE’s annual income collected was between $175 million and $385 million.”233 Thus, 
the rise of LTTE was an impediment in the democratic consolidation of the state and in 
all arenas of democratic consolidation in the time to come. 
The conflict between the GoSL and the LTTE, particularly in the Northern and 
Eastern Provinces, severely affected all five arenas of democratic consolidation discussed 
in Chapter I. The LTTE’s totalitarian rule denied democratic alternatives to the Tamils in 
the Northern and Eastern Provinces, while the civil society in other areas was also 
affected by the conflict.234 Also, the conflict led to the militarization of the country by 
activities of both the military and the LTTE. Bush states that the activities of NGOs were 
subjected to restriction from both the GoSL and the LTTE; the emergency regulations in 
1993 compelled “all NGOs to register all financial receipts” and distributions and, in 
2002, the LTTE denied the “local staff of the major international NGOs” such as 
OXFAM, CARE, and FORUT permission to leave LTTE-controlled areas.235 Also, 
Rupesinghe states that during the final battle against the LTTE in 2009, the GoSL did not 
allow the local or foreign media reporters and NGOs and foreign dignitaries inside the 
battle zone.236 According to M.R.R. Hoole, “indeed the LTTE’s armed struggle became 
conditional upon the complete paralysis of civil society and the silencing, if not the 
complicity, of institutions such as churches and centers of learning.”237 The Tamil 
community feared to raise their voice after the LTTE’s assassination of Rajani 
Thiranagama of University Teachers for Human Rights (UTHR), Jaffna, and chasing the 
UTHR members out of Jaffna.238  
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Meanwhile, the military became the primary and accepted guardians of national 
security; the state encouraged this sentiment across the country to justify the use of the 
military.239 Nira states that the “security forces have been invested by the state with a sort 
of semi-divine aura…it was considered a crime against the state to criticize the security 
forces even if they had committed excess.”240 Increased security provided an 
environment conducive to developing civil society organization, however; it also had a 
ripple effect in the development of political society.  
The LTTE’s rise negatively affected the political society statewide. The group’s 
totalitarian rule in its controlled areas in the Northern and Eastern Provinces Province 
denied the peoples’ political participation; it did not allow moderate political activity in 
its controlled areas. Rupesinghe states, “in the areas under the LTTE, the civilians fell 
completely under the writ of the LTTE, whose totalitarian control was uncontested.”241 
In 2001, the TULF, ACTC and former militant groups the EPRLF and the TELO formed 
an alliance, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA).242 The TNA accepted the LTTE as sole 
representatives of Tamils, however, “becoming what critics have called mindless and 
soulless puppets of the LTTE.”243 Tamils in the LTTE-controlled areas did not have the 
right to select their representatives because the LTTE forced the people either to abstain 
from voting or to vote for the candidates preferred by the LTTE.244 There was no local 
government for the Tamils to articulate their political interests because the Northern and 
Eastern Provinces Provincial Council was dysfunctional. Also, continuing the previous 
practice, the LTTE asked the majority of Tamils in the North and East to boycott the 
2005 presidential elections.245 At the same time, the LTTE’s assassination of Sinhala 
political leaders and moderate Tamil leaders further hindered the autonomy of political 
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society.246 The resulting security concerns compelled the GoSL to deploy the military to 
provide protection to the political leaders and for the election process statewide. 
Increased security helped the politicians to form political parties, create party alliances, 
and engage in political works, and the citizens to choose their political representatives 
free from LTTE intimidations. 
Meanwhile, the rise of the LTTE challenged the state’s rule of law. There was no 
space for the rule of law in the LTTE-controlled areas because neither the police nor the 
military were there to guarantee the peoples’ rights under the rule of law.247 The LTTE 
engaged in human rights violations by killing Tamil dissidents, Sinhalese, and Muslims 
and conducted ethnic cleansing of Sinhalese and Muslims to create a mono-ethnic Tamil 
state.248 The people suffered from movement restrictions, forceful evictions, forceful 
conscription, and the rule of the gun enforced by the LTTE; it further challenged the 
state’s rule of law by establishing its own judicial system.249 The GoSL’s efforts to 
ensure the state’s security also affected the rule of law. The GoSL empowered and 
deployed the military to maintain the state’s sovereignty. The emergency law, the PTA, 
military operations, and goods embargos to the LTTE-controlled areas created negative 
implications to the rule of law.250 Nira states that for Sri Lanka “security means the 
protection of boundaries of the sovereign state from external and internal aggression. 
Recently, the concept broadened to include a concern for the human side of security.”251 
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The impact on civil and political societies and the rule of law resulted from the weakened 
state bureaucracy. 
The conflict affected the state bureaucracy’s ability to implement government 
policies. The LTTE’s coercion prevented the state bureaucracy from carrying out 
government instructions in its controlled areas.252 Also, the group established its own 
administration, which severely undermined the state’s rule.253 On the other hand, because 
of security concerns in the Northern and Eastern Provinces and for better coordination 
with the military, the successive governments entrusted military officers to perform civil 
administrative duties. Since the 1990s, retired Army generals held the Northern and 
Eastern Provinces Province’s governor and the Secretary of Defense Ministry posts.254 
The military employees effectively performed civil administrative duties; this 
undermined the development of civilian bureaucracy in the long run in the area and hence 
expanded militarization, however.  
The conflict severely affected the country’s economy. The North and South 
economic regions gradually disconnected and national economy was undermined. 
Venugopal asserts that the North and the East “became not just more impoverished in 
absolute terms, but ever more economically disconnected and irrelevant to the island’s 
economic development as a whole.”255 The embargos enforced by the GoSL on certain 
goods such as petroleum products and fertilizers to LTTE-controlled areas and taxes 
imposed by the LTTE in its controlled areas further increased the economic constraints in 
conflict-affected areas. This further expanded the military’s presence in the areas and the 
military economy helped alleviate economic burdens to a certain extent as the military 
purchased products of the Northern and Eastern Provinces as a part of its operations. 
Surprisingly, Sri Lanka did well throughout this period, creating a paradox for 
economists. Amidst the destruction due to protracted conflict, the successive 
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governments implemented market reforms and export-driven industrialization strategies; 
annual GDP growth was at 4.6 percent and the exports multiplied by three times.256 
Economic growth and stability provided the governments the base to expand the military 
budget from U.S.$187 million in 1990 to U.S.$1522 million in 2009 (see Table 3). The 
employment provided by the military stabilized the socio-political conditions in 
implementing controversial privatization and market reforms.257 Thus, militarization was 
also a result of economic growth during the conflict.  
2. The Eelam War III and Regaining the Jaffna Peninsula 
The failure of the 1995 Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) led the GoSL to regain 
control of the Jaffna Peninsula. President Mrs. Kumaratunga of the People’s Alliance 
(PA) initiated peace talks with the LTTE and both parties signed a declaration of 
Cessation of Hostilities in January 1995.258 The GoSL released a devolution package for 
limited political autonomy for the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The NGO peace 
lobby began to promote the peace process; the LTTE, however, fearing the loss of 
control, prevented the emergence of peace movements in its controlled areas.259 Also, the 
Sinhala nationalists opposed the peace process because they considered it as a 
capitulation to Tamil separatism and a threat to the sovereignty of Sri Lanka.260 As per 
previous practice, the LTTE used the peace period to purchase arms and regroup. The 
LTTE’s intransigence led to the failure of the peace process; it broke the CFA in April 
1995. The failure of a number of peace attempts and the LTTE’s continuing terrorist 
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attacks statewide increased the majority public opinion in favor of the government’s 
military endeavors against the LTTE.261  
The GoSL commenced a military campaign called Operation Riviresa to regain 
Jaffna in August 1995. The military reestablished the GoSL’s control in the Jaffna 
Peninsula, the Tamil heartland, in December 1995.262 The eventual GoSL’s control over 
the Jaffna Peninsula was a significant factor contributing to the LTTE’s subsequent 
defeat because the LTTE lost its recruiting ground. The military deployed throughout the 
peninsula to prevent terrorist activities. In addition, the Army conducted Civil Military 
Cooperation (CIMIC) activities to assist the civilians to restore their livelihood. 
Following the loss of Jaffna, the LTTE shifted its capital to Kilinochchi and brought the 
war to the south in a series of suicide bombings and large-scale attacks on the military 
camps. The suicide vehicle attack on the Central Bank in January 1996 and the 
destruction of the Mullaitivu Army camp were significant attacks.263 The military 
encouraged CIMIC duties that legitimized the military deployment on one hand, but was 
dissatisfied by the fall of Mullaitivu and the LTTE’s continuing assassinations of local 
military commanders.264 Meanwhile, the GoSL needed to open up a land route to sustain 
control of Jaffna Peninsula. 
The military operations to open up a land route to Jaffna eventually led to a 
military stalemate.265 The military began another campaign, Operation Jayasikuru, to 
regain territory in Vanni and Mullaitivu to open a land route between Vavuniya and 
Jaffna in 1997. The operation led to massive military buildup on both sides. The military 
regained control of Kilinochchi by 1999; the LTTE, however, regained some of its lost 
territories since November 1999. The loss of Elephant Pass was a failure for the GoSL 
because it was the strategic cut-off point linking Jaffna Peninsula to the mainland.266 The 
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setbacks suffered in Vanni led to a loss of morale for the military.267 On the other hand, 
the global war on terror after 9/11 in the United States was a severe blow to the LTTE’s 
ability to raise funds and arms overseas as the United States and its allies sought to 
destroy global funding for terrorism. Two years of fighting resulted in heavy losses for 
both the military and the LTTE. During this time, no democratic activities occurred in the 
Northern and Eastern provinces and the state continued to use the military as its primary 
force in policing. 
In the meantime, the military gained a new micro role, that is, to provide security 
to the politicians. Due to the LTTE’s threat to the politicians, the GoSL tasked military 
units to provide security to some politicians. For instance, Deputy Defense Minister 
Anuruddha Ratwatte had a large group of security men armed with automatic weapons. 
When the politicians engaged in political campaigns, the security personnel had an 
intimidating effect on the electorate, especially the political opponents of that 
politician.268 Also, there were allegations that the Presidential Security Division (PSD) 
was involved in electoral violence and intimidation.269 De Silva states that the use of the 
military by the politicians for parity political purposes became a threat to the country’s 
democratic system.270  
Meanwhile, President Mrs. Kumaratunga assumed office for a second term in 
2000. The support from minority communal parties was critical for both the SLFP and 
the UNP in their political competition. The Muslim and Tamil political parties including 
the TNA, which had the LTTE’s influence, supported the UNP; it facilitated a narrow 
victory for the UNP-led United National Front (UNF). The UNF established a 
government in 2001 for bringing peace by negotiating with the LTTE.271 The UNF’s 
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victory was a mandate for local and international peace lobbies to end military operations 
and resume negotiations with the LTTE.272  
3. The Eelam War IV and the Defeat of the LTTE   
The failure of the 2002 CFA led the GoSL to resort to military options to resolve 
the conflict. The GOSL signed the CFA with the LTTE in February 2002.273 The 
Norwegian-facilitated peace-at-any-cost approach was a huge blow to democratic 
consolidation in Sri Lanka; the agreement demarcated demilitarized zones, giving the 
LTTE-controlled areas de jure recognition (see Figure 2), and recognized the totalitarian 
LTTE as the sole representatives of the Tamils in disregard of the elected Tamil 
representatives.274 The agreement was not to the satisfaction of the military due to the 
recognition gained by the LTTE. Also, the agreement provided the LTTE the opportunity 
to transform its de facto control to a de jure control by establishment of its own judiciary, 
police, revenue collection and strong military, which consisted of ground, naval, and air 
forces.275 During the peace talks, the LTTE’s Eastern Leader, Karuna, broke away from 
the LTTE.276 The LTTE, assisted by international non-governmental organizations 
(INGOs), put forward a proposal for an Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA), which 
was a blueprint to create a separate state.277 President Mrs. Kumaratunga dissolved the 
parliament in February 2004 based on mass discontent with the LTTE’s military buildup, 
INGO support for the LTTE, and ISGA proposals.278 The GoSL continued its 
commitment to the peace process, however.  
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Figure 2.  The Areas Controlled by the LTTE during the 2002 CFA.279 
\ 
The SLFP-led United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) won the 2004 elections 
with its promise to advance the peace process. Bandarage states that mass discontent with 
the handling of the peace process was the reason for the defeat of the UNF and the 
resurgence of Sinhala nationalist parties in 2004.280 The GoSL rejected the LTTE’s claim 
as the “sole representative of Tamils” and the ISGA proposals.281 The LTTE walked out 
of negotiations in 2004 and resumed terrorist attacks statewide. During the 2005 
presidential elections, the LTTE prohibited the people from voting to prevent the UNP’s 
Ranil Wickramasinghe assuming office. Mahinda Rajapaksa became the president and 
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expressed his commitment to the peace process.282 The LTTE increased terrorist 
activities against Sinhala civilians and military leaders. The assassination of the Deputy 
Army Commander, attempted assassination of the Army Commander, and massacre of 
civilians in Kebitigollewa resulted in a huge public protest calling for stern military 
action to defeat the LTTE’s terrorism.283 In 2006, the LTTE’s closure of Mavil Aru dam, 
which denied water to civilians, compelled President Rajapaksa to instigate military 
actions to defeat the LTTE.284  
The military began humanitarian operations in the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces. The military launched its operations in the Eastern Province in September 
2006 and liberated the province in July 2007 with the LTTE fleeing to the Northern 
Province. Soon after the liberation of the East, the GoSL implemented a recovery and 
development program called Nagenahira Navodaya (Eastern Re-awakening) to develop 
the well-being of the people and for recovery of the region.285 Also, the GoSL 
commenced military operations to liberate the North in September 2007. The Northern 
Humanitarian Operation was the largest ever military operation in Sri Lanka. The 
operation was organized around four axes by five Army divisions and three tasks forces, 
with back-up support from the Navy and the Air Force. The LTTE was unable to stand 
against the military thrust and used civilians as human shields.286 The operation 
successfully concluded on May 19, 2009 with the death of the leader of the LTTE, 
Prabhakaran, and other top leaders.287 Thus, the government regained control of the 
sovereign territory. The operation led to the death of a large number of military personnel 
and LTTE cadres and the displacement of over 300,000 civilians, huge damage to 
government and civilian property, and allegations that the military had violated human 
rights.      
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The LTTE became the primary challenge to democratic consolidation of the state. 
The rise of the LTTE severely affected all the arenas of democratic consolidation. The 
successive governments tried to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. The LTTE’s rigid 
stance on a separate state and reliance on violence to attain its goal made the 1995 and 
2002 CFA fail. The failure of successive peace attempts and the LTTE’s increased use of 
terrorism compelled the GoSL to resort to military tactics to defeat the LTTE. Ultimately, 
the GoSL regained its control by militarily defeating the LTTE in May 2009, which 
allowed the possibility of democratic consolidation. The GoSL’s heavy reliance on the 
military to maintain control significantly developed the CMR, while the CMR had both a 
positive and negative impact on democratic consolidation. The next section discusses the 
CMR in detail from 1990 to 2009.   
B. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: 1990–2009 
Sri Lanka stepped into a new arena of civil-military relations with the 
commencement of the Second Eelam War. The successive civilian leaders had first tried 
to find a negotiated solution to the conflict; however, they were compelled to resort to the 
use of force because the LTTE did not compromise their demand for a separate state. 
Hence, the military became the most important actor in maintaining the state’s 
sovereignty. Thus, the civilian leaders strengthened the relationship with the military. 
This section discusses the development of democratic civilian control and the 
effectiveness of the military.   
1. Democratic Civilian Control of the Military 
The transformation of the conflict into a high-intensity, semi-conventional war 
demanded a larger, well-equipped, and trained military force to face the threats posed by 
the LTTE. Also, the successive governments used the military’s victories to maintain 
their popularity. As a result, the successive government strengthened their control of the 
military while developing the military’s capabilities. This section discusses the 
developments of the institutional control mechanisms, oversight, and professionalism of 
the military.     
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a. Institutional Control Mechanisms 
The successive governments continued the executive civilian control over the 
military. The executive president exercised the authority in making decisions related to 
national security as the head of state, the commander-in-chief, and the Minister of 
Defense.288 Also, the president continued to have the final approval on appointment of 
three service commanders and promotions, and retirements of the military officers. 
President Kumaratunga, during the office, appointed her uncle General Ratwatte as the 
Deputy Minister of Defense creating an effective link with the military.289 Also, the 2002 
UNP government appointed an elected Minister of Parliament as the Minister of Defense. 
In 2005, however, the president became the Minister of Defense consolidating executive 
civilian control over the military.    
The organizational mechanisms continued to facilitate the civilians to exercise 
control and oversight over the military. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the National 
Security Council continued to be the principal mechanism of control and oversight of the 
military. In 1999, the GoSL officially established the NSC “to centralize political 
command and control.”290 The three service commanders remained principal advisors of 
their services to the chairperson of the NSC, the president. The powers of the MOD 
significantly increased after 2006 in an effort to coordinate the campaign to defeat the 
LTTE. The GoSL extended the responsibilities of the MOD including the police, 
intelligence services, defense training and education, Cadet Corps, Civil Defense Force, 
and the Departments of Immigration and Emigration, Registration of Persons, and 
Control of Dangerous Drugs, under the purview of the MOD. Moorcraft posits, “Such 
extensive powers provoked the criticism that Sri Lanka was a national security state.”291 
Thus, both the MOD and the NSC increased the institutional control and oversight over 
the military.  
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In addition, the Secretary of the MOD became powerful in the control of the 
military. During 1994–2003, civilians held the post. In 2005, President Rajapaksa 
appointed his brother, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, a retired military officer with battle 
experience, as the secretary of defense.292 Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s close relationship with 
the military and the direct link to the president was a “successful civil-military 
interface.”293 It served as a loyal and rapid central command, according to Moorcraft, 
“the key to the strategic success of the GoSL in defeating the LTTE.294  
b. Oversight 
The oversight of the military remained weak during the period. The legislature, 
judiciary, and other organizations continued a limited oversight of the military. The 
Human Rights Commission became a significant oversight mechanism from 1996 
because it could inquire into the civilians’ complaints against military personnel on 
actions committed in their official capacity.295 The militarization severely affected the 
oversight of the military by the civil society, however. With the increase of the intensity 
of the conflict, the military became the protectors of the nation and the majority of the 
people believed criticism of the military was the same as supporting the LTTE. Thus, any 
media, NGO, or civil society organization that criticized military activities was subjected 
to opposition with the elites’ belief that it would hinder the national security.296 Also, De 
Silva states that Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the Secretary of Defense, had “more influence than 
the Cabinet ministers, merely because he is the President’s brother;” as a result, “the 
Cabinet has lost any independent authority or influence it may previously had in matters 
of defence and security-policy.”297  
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c. Professionalism  
 The increase in the intensity of the conflict resulted in the development of the 
military’s professionalism. The GoSL’s counterinsurgency campaign demanded the 
development of the military’s expertise, scope of essential duties, sense of responsibility, 
and cohesiveness. The training provided the military the required combat and 
professional skills for efficient performance of assigned tasks. All the three services had 
the opportunity to establish training facilities as per service requirements. Middle-level 
military officers from all services got education from the Command and Staff College 
established in 1997.298 Also, foreign military training from regional countries, the U.S., 
China, and Southeast Asian nations such as Indonesia and Malaysia provided the military 
the opportunity to develop professional knowledge and establish military-to-military 
relationships. In addition, the experience gained in battle enhanced the military’s 
expertise.299 Final military operations gave relative independence to military hierarchy to 
take effective routine military operations free from civilian political influence.300  
Meanwhile, the establishment of the military Directorate of International 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights (DIHL&HR) served to develop the military’s 
responsibility to follow International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Human Rights (HR). 
The Joint Services Language Training Institute (JSLTI) provides Tamil language 
education for the military personnel to serve in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.301 
The Institute for Peace Support Operations Training Sri Lanka (IPSOTSL) provided 
international peacekeeping training for local and foreign trainees. The Sri Lankan 
military has increased its participation in UN peacekeeping missions since 2006. The 
participation in UN peacekeeping helped improve participants’ multi-national operations 
capabilities and the country’s services economy. Thus, increased training and experience 
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improved the professionalism of the military, solidifying the civilian control over the 
military.     
 The military’s continuing politicization and expansion into the civilian sphere of 
business negatively affected its professional norms, however. The military’s expansion 
into the civilian sector and increased military strength due to the conflict led to the 
politicization of the military. Politicization creates a divided military, affecting cohesion 
and political neutrality in fulfilling responsibilities. Senanayake notes that several ex-
servicemen have argued, “[P]olitical interference in the armed forces has countermanded 
not only the military chain of command but discipline within the armed forces at large in 
the war against the LTTE.”302 Also, the reliance on external procurement resulted in the 
deployment of the military officers in diplomatic positions in the countries that were of 
strategic interest for military hardware procurement. For instance, retired Army 
Commander General Srilal Weerasooriya became the High Commissioner to Pakistan in 
1998 to facilitate defense procurements. At the same time, political-level defense 
procurement resulted in corruption of the military as well. Bandarage states that between 
U.S.$80 million and U.S.$120 million went to politicians and military officials from the 
allocations to purchase military equipment during the early 2000s.303  
2. Effectiveness of the Military 
The internal insurgencies resulted in the development of effectiveness of the 
military. After the 1971 JVP insurrection, the GoSL paid its attention to increase the 
capabilities of the military. Further, the GoSL realized the need to increase the military’s 
effectiveness with the escalation of separatist insurgency in 1983. Thus, the military 
solely focused on counterinsurgency and developed capabilities accordingly. Since 1995, 
the military has significantly developed its capabilities. Further, the GoSL’s decision to 
defeat the LTTE militarily resulted in the dramatic increase of the effectiveness of the 
military. The following paragraphs discuss the plans and structures of the military and the 
commitment of resources for it.   
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a. Plans: Doctrines and Strategies 
The increases of the intensity of the conflict resulted in the development of 
strategies to counter the LTTE. The conflict between the GoSL and the LTTE provided 
the military a legitimate military mission, that is, to maintain national security. To 
maintain national security, the military had to defeat the LTTE and thus military focus 
was on counterinsurgency; subsequently, it developed to counter-terrorism. As had been 
done previously, the evolution of the military doctrine was reactive to the threat.304 
During the 1990s, the LTTE launched semi-conventional military operations and the 
military organized and conducted operations as a conventional force. This is evident by 
the large-scale military operations conducted to liberate the Jaffna Peninsula and to open 
up a land route to Jaffna.305 The conventional operations focused the military on gaining 
territory instead of separating the insurgents from the population and placed less concern 
on the human security aspect.  
The military focused on winning hearts and minds of the people after liberation of 
the Jaffna Peninsula, however. The Army included civil affairs into the organizational 
structure, posted civil affairs officers at the brigade level, and established civil affairs 
offices down to the company level. These civil affairs offices conducted population and 
resource control tasks. Meanwhile, the military had to deploy the regular reserve 
personnel to maintain essential services as civilian employees were reluctant to come to 
Jaffna due to security concerns.306 Despite the military’s support to civil authorities to 
restore normalcy, the military’s engagement in the civilian sphere of business led to 
criticism of the military deployment as militarization.  
Meanwhile, after the Vanni debacle, the military’s doctrinal focus changed. The 
military’s doctrinal focus changed from conventional operations to high intensity 
counter-terrorism operations from the 2000s.The military realized the need to develop 
small group operations and night fighting capabilities. When the 2002 CFA became 
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unsuccessful, the military changed the doctrinal focus to counter the LTTE strategies and 
tactics. Accordingly, the Army trained the personnel to platoon-level operations through 
Advance Infantry Platoon Training (AIPT) and eight-men team operations through 
Special Infantry Operations Teams (SIOT).307 The Navy also developed brown water 
fighting capabilities with special boat squadron and blue water capabilities to interdict the 
LTTE fleet.308 The Air Force developed capabilities on precise target interdiction and 
close air support with rotary wing platforms.309 The joint concept to coordinate the three 
services and achieve the desired military effect was a significant development. The 
Humanitarian Operation 2006–2009 was evidence of the GoSL’s clear strategy for 
military defeat of the LTTE increasing the size, quality and equipment of the military.310  
b. Structural Development 
The structural changes took place with the evolution of doctrinal focus of the 
military. Revamping of the Joint Operations Headquarters (JOH) and modernization of 
the armed services in response to the threat posed by the LTTE also occurred. The JOH 
was reinstituted in 1999 and renamed the Office of the Chief of Defense Staff (OCDS) in 
the early 2000s. The JOH and the OCDS was important to coordinate the armed forces 
during joint operations. Both the Navy and the Air Force established their ground 
operations forces, the Naval Patrolmen Branch and the Air Force Regiment. Also, given 
the magnitude of the LTTE’s expansion of terrorist atrocities in the south, new 
organizations came up to ensure security. The Operations Command Colombo (OCC) 
was a joint force raised in 1995 to ensure security in Colombo.311 The Home Guards was 
created under a special provision of the MOD to protect the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces’ border villages; subsequently, the organization was revamped with military 
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training, to become the Civil Defense Force (CDF) in 2006.312 All the structural changes 
significantly contributed to the development of the military’s effectiveness.  
Proportionate ethnic group representation might have increased the military’s 
effectiveness as an impartial force, however. Since the 1960s, the Sinhala percentage in 
the military increased and by the 1990s, the ethnic composition of the military was 
predominantly Sinhalese, as shown in Figure 3. According to De Silva, Tamils’ 
representation in the military declined due to two reasons. First, the Tamils were reluctant 
to join the military because their families were vulnerable to threats from the LTTE and 
its allies. Second, since the military fight had begun against Tamil separatists, “Tamils 
were treated with suspicion by the recruiting officers at the point of entry, and by their 
peers once they joined.”313 De Silva notes that an ethnically mixed force is more 
effective in dealing with an ethnic conflict.314 Thus, the minority representation would 
have more benefit to the military for winning the hearts and minds of the people in the 
conflict-affected Northern and Eastern Provinces. 
Figure 3.  Ethnic Composition of the Officer Corps of the Military 
(as of 1996).315 
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c. Commitment of Resources 
The conflict between the GoSL and the LTTE demanded a huge increase in 
military resources. To facilitate the doctrinal and structural changes, resource allocation 
increased for organizational expansion and training of the military. The strength of the 
military took a sudden increase in the 1990s and almost doubled after 2005 (see Table 6), 
while civilian employees in the military establishment also increased. According to 
Regan, increased strength is an indication of the increased militarization.316 Also, 
proportional to the country’s population, Sri Lanka had the largest military in South 
Asia.317  
Table 6.  The Strength of the Army: 1990–2010 (Selected Years).318 
 1990 1993 1998 2003 2008 2010 
Number  of 
personnel 
60,000 90,000 120,000 130,000 200,000 230,000 
 
The defense budget increased to facilitate the previously discussed structural 
changes in the military. There has been a substantial escalation of defense expenditure 
from the 1990s (see Table 7). The increased defense expenditure has paradoxical effects. 
As mentioned previously in this chapter, increased military strength helped mitigate the 
effects of privatization during market reforms by balancing the public sector 
employment. It also helped to stabilize the economies of agricultural and rural districts, 
the home areas of the major portion of military members. In addition, the salary level of 
the military was considerably high in comparison with the other members of the public 
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and private sectors.319 The high level of salaries helped to develop civil and economic 
societies and the military to maintain obedience to the civilian leadership.  
Table 7.  GDP and Defense Spending: 1990–2009 (Selected 
Years).320 





















187 764 822 644 791 1055 1511 1522 
Defense Spending (As 
a percentage the GDP) 
2.48 6.11 5.00 2.60 2.80 3.30 3.70 3.60 
Defense Spending (As 
a percentage of the 
Government’s 
Spending 
7.51 19.22 18.85 11.06 11.52 13.90 16.46 14.56 
 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The LTTE’s rise since the 1990s became the significant factor that affected Sri 
Lanka’s democratic consolidation and CMR. The LTTE gained control over considerable 
area in the Northern and Eastern Provinces and continued to pose a separatist threat by 
expanding its violence throughout the state. In response, the successive governments 
adapted a two-pronged policy: a military response often associated with political 
negotiations. The priority alternated between the two policies depending upon the success 
achieved from one of them or the internal political pressure and external pressure, 
particularly from India. Given the failure of the 1995 and 2002 CFA, the military became 
the sole solution to the country’s protracted conflict. The military defeated the LTTE in 
May 2009, assuring the GoSL’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Thus, the 
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deployment of the military resulted in the creation of conditions for democratic 
consolidation while affecting both positive and negative implications for the development 
of civil and economic societies, the rule of law and the civilian bureaucracy.  
The CMR significantly improved because of the necessity to defeat the separatist 
LTTE. The civilian control of the military solidified through the executive civilian 
control and revamped institutional mechanisms: the MOD and the NSC. The oversight, 
however, continued to be limited. The increase of the military effectiveness is evident by 
the military’s success in defeating the LTTE in a short time period. The increased 
strength and resources contributed to increase the militarization, thus negatively affecting 
the civil, political, and economic societies. On the other hand, militarization helped to 
create an environment conducive to democratic consolidation, particularly facilitating 
economic growth due to improved security. Meanwhile, increased military 
professionalism further strengthened the civilian control of the military. Thus, the CMR 
more positively contributed to democratic consideration while displaying some distinct 
trends.  
The CMR contributed to democratic consolidation through some distinct trends in 
the deployment of the military. The use of the military in non-military tasks and in the 
civilian sphere of business became a trend; it helped to defeat the LTTE at the expense of 
development of civil society, civilian bureaucracy, and democratic norms. First, the sole 
means available for the GoSL to solve the conflict was the military because the LTTE’s 
compromise to a negotiated solution was suspicious. Second, ensuring national security 
by countering the LTTE became the legitimate mission for the military. Third, civilian 
leaders used the military to fill the vacuum of supportive bureaucracy needed for 
reconstruction of conflict-affected areas. Fourth, the GoSL used the military officers to 
hold civilian appointments that required coordination with the military; the organizational 
discipline of the military was successful in delivering desired results. In this context, the 
next chapter discusses the implications of the deployment of the military in post-conflict 
reconstitution toward democratic consolidation and CMR.   
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IV. POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION: DEMOCRATIC 
CONSOLIDATION AND CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS 
The defeat of the LTTE in May 2009 created the conditions for the democratic 
consolidation of Sri Lanka with some continuing challenges, as discussed in the previous 
chapter. The Tamil diaspora emerged as a new external obstacle, further strengthening its 
claim for a separate state in Sri Lanka. Also, the TNA continued its claim for regional 
autonomy while solidifying support from Tamil Nadu. The continuing struggle for a 
separate state created tension for Sri Lanka; it resulted in a mass public opinion against 
the reduction of military presence in the North and East and downsizing the military. 
Meanwhile, the GoSL encountered other challenges such as the rehabilitation and the 
reintegration of the LTTE cadres into society, the resettlement of approximately 300,000 
IDPs, the development of infrastructure, and the restoration of normalcy and law and 
order in the conflict-affected areas.  
To address the immediate challenges, the GoSL initiated two separate 
reconstruction programs for the Northern and Eastern provinces. The GoSL assigned the 
military a prominent role in the development programs because of the military’s high 
level of effectiveness, skilled organizations, and the need to maintain security. Thus, the 
military continued its deployment in the Northern and Eastern Provinces to facilitate its 
commitment to the reconstruction program.  
Meanwhile, the GoSL redeployed the military in statewide nation-building tasks. 
The critics within and outside Sri Lanka describe the deployment of the military for post-
conflict reconstruction and statewide nation-building tasks, the continuing high defense 
budget and a large military as securitization or militarization, which hinders 
democratization. The deployment of the military in post-conflict reconstruction, ensuring 
security and strengthening the administration, resulted in short-term positive effects 
towards democratic consolidation, however, while creating both positive and negative 
affects towards CMR. Over the long term, continuing militarization may be a hindrance 
to democratization. This chapter discusses Sri Lanka’s strategic environment after the 
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defeat of the LTTE and the military’s role in post-conflict reconstruction, political 
developments, and CMR from 2009 to 2016.  
A. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT OF SRI LANKA AFTER THE 
DEFEAT OF THE LTTE 
Sri Lanka’s strategic environment after the defeat of the LTTE was characterized 
by internal and external serious concerns that had to be addressed urgently. The foremost 
concern was the establishment of law and order in the areas that had been under the 
control of the LTTE since the 1990s. This concern was further heightened by the 
possibility of the resurgence of the LTTE because of the escaped LTTE cadres and 
hidden arms caches.321 Hashim asserts that the sustenance of military victory requires a 
coordinated and sustained political follow-up, “backed up by continued intelligence, 
police and military vigilance.”322 The eruption of the LTTE’s terrorism in Sri Lanka 
during the peace efforts in 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2002, and its uncompromising stance 
on establishing a separate state, strengthened the need for maintaining vigilance.  
Meanwhile, the Tamil diaspora reorganized to pose challenges to the sovereignty 
of Sri Lanka. Immediately after the defeat of the LTTE, the new Tamil diaspora front 
organizations took over the struggle for the Tamil Eelam.323 The Tamil diaspora now 
organized on two fronts. One side, the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam 
(TGTE, the Kumaran Padmanadan or Rudra faction) and the Global Tamil Forum (GTF, 
Father S.J. Emmanual faction) sought to attain the Eelam through political and diplomatic 
engagement in the long run. The second side, The Tamil Eelam Peoples Assembly 
(TEPA, Nediyavan faction) was strongly committed to the resurgence of the LTTE to 
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continue the armed struggle back in Sri Lanka.324 The Tamil diaspora needed the support 
of the Tamils in Sri Lanka to create a separate state, however. Hence, the GoSL was 
compelled to continue the military deployment throughout the island to prevent the 
resurgence of the LTTE, as well as to provide security to the post-conflict reconstruction 
process. Hashim states that “fear of the revival of Tamil extremism” led the GoSL to see 
everything “through the lens of national security.”325  
Meanwhile, the GoSL faced several challenges in national re-integration. 
Reconstruction, resettlement, and rehabilitation were the immediate matters to be 
handled.326 This process included the accommodation and resettlement of approximately 
300,000 IDPs, de-mining, the restoration of infrastructure and facilities, and reintegration 
of nearly 12,000 ex-LTTE cadres after rehabilitation.327 These tasks were a major 
challenge because of a lack of bureaucratic structure and the immediate absence of 
civilian organizations necessary to undertake the tasks due to security concerns and lack 
of facilities. Also, due to the danger posed by landmines, de-mining was urgently needed 
for the civilian organization to access the conflict-affected areas. Thus, there was a need 
for an organization that could handle such security issues and undertake these challenges. 
In this context, for several reasons, the military was the immediately available 
competent resource to create an environment conducive for the civilian organizations to 
assume their responsibilities. First, the military had already been deployed in the conflict-
affected areas, providing security, and could be deployed for CIMIC missions. Second, 
doctrinally, the Army had an institutionalized and experienced organizational structure to 
perform the tasks necessary for the restoration of normalcy. Third, the Army’s disciplined 
and hierarchical organization facilitated the undertakings at the behest of the GoSL, 
acknowledging the civilian supremacy. Thus, the GoSL deployed the military in post-
conflict reconstruction in association with the civil authorities. 
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Moreover, the GoSL was under pressure both domestically and externally. The 
international pressure was exerted on the GoSL to reduce the military’s strength and 
deployments in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, carry out political reforms, and 
demand war crime accountability; the TNA also made similar demands.328 Wijewardane 
states, “Western governments, perhaps genuinely pursuing protection of human rights, 
and spurred on by a section of the Tamil Diaspora, will continue to search for 
opportunities to punish Sri Lanka.”329 Since the 2002 CFA, however, Sinhalese critics 
described the proposals to remove and minimize the HSZs, and downsize or right-size the 
Sri Lankan military, as an effort to degrade its power.330 Also, they opposed the 
federalism as an effort to divide the country.331 Furthermore, according to Hashim, “The 
Sinhala community, a majority in Sri Lanka, continues to fear the Tamils, and has a 
minority complex in relation to the larger Tamil population in Tamil Nadu.”332 
Moreover, Tamil chauvinist mobilization in Tamil Nadu and the Tamil diaspora’s active 
support of the quest for Tamil Eelam increased the fear among the Sinhalese on 
resurgence of the LTTE.333 In this context, the GoSL maintained the military’s strength 
and deployments.   
In addition, Sri Lanka’s strategic maritime location in the Indian Ocean had 
several implications. On one hand, it provided the opportunity to be the maritime hub in 
the increasingly busy East-West trade route just south of the island and, on the other 
hand, increased the threat of the country becoming a hub for transnational crimes. The 
country became a transit point for drugs and a source area for human trafficking and arms 
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smuggling.334 Also, the encroachment on territorial waters by South Indian fishermen 
and the illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and maritime pollution are 
acute problems for Sri Lanka. Since independence, the Army has assisted the authorities 
in law enforcement. Thus, statewide military deployment became a necessity until the 
authorities gained control in their respective fields. The next section discusses the 
military’s role in the post-conflict reconstruction, with the strategic environment as the 
backdrop. 
B. THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION 
In a post-conflict situation, the military has to play a vital role until the restoration 
of normalcy and the other government institutes regain their control. This is true in the 
Sri Lankan scenario too. As discussed in the previous section, the military becomes the 
important organization to assist civil authorities to undertake immediate post-conflict 
challenges. This section discusses the roles played by the military in provision of 
security, reconstruction of conflict-affected areas, and statewide nation building.      
1. Provision of Security 
As discussed previously, maintenance of security and order were paramount for post-
conflict reconstruction, particularly in the conflict-affected areas. Also, according to the 
post-conflict reconstruction model conceptualized by Jabareen, which was discussed in 
Chapter I, in the sequencing of reconstruction, “security and order comes first followed 
by economic development and only then democracy.”335 Hence, as discussed in the 
previous section, it was necessary for the Army to maintain a heavy presence in the 
country, particularly in the Northern and Eastern province, to prevent the revival of Tamil 
extremism until the police could establish their control.336 Thus, the GoSL re-deployed 
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state again is a formidable task, something amounting to a fundamental reconstruction of the territorial 
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the Army to cover every district of the country to serve as the reserve of the police to 
maintain law and order and to respond during natural disasters.337 The Army’s continuing 
presence and clearance of thousands of the LTTE’s weapon caches reduced the fear and 
uncertainty created by the possibility of the resurgence of the LTTE.338 The continuing 
military presence may be a reason to prevent the revival of the LTTE. In that case, 
militarization helped the progress of democratic consolidation.  
Meanwhile, continuing militarization resulted in both positive and negative 
effects on democratization. The GoSL’s decision to maintain the military’s strength 
without a sudden demobilization helped to stabilize the country and also to maintain 
security. Moorcraft quotes the observation of one American development expert, “By 
resisting international pressure to down-size its military, Sri Lanka has avoided the 
potential threat of having tens of thousands of weapons-trained and battle-hardened 
troops being reintegrated into the hum-drum routines of civilian life where the purchasing 
power of their pensions would diminish with inflation.”339   
The military’s continuing deployment in High Security Zones (HSZ), however, 
was subjected to criticism as an impediment to reconciliation, because the legitimate land 
owners could not access their lands.340 Although the GoSL pays rent for the buildings 
occupied by the military and allocates new lands, interest groups continue their claims to 
those same lands. With increased security, the establishment of police stations, and the 
function of civilian administration, the military reduced its security activities and 
presence. Also, the GoSL gradually reduced the majority of the military’s HSZs in the 
Northern and Eastern Provinces, released the lands to legitimate owners, and lifted the 
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emergency regulations in November 2011.341 By 2016, the military was nearly confined 
to the strategic bases, performing CIMIC missions at the behest of the GoSL. Although 
subjected to criticism, the military’s success in providing security helped restore 
normalcy in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. In addition to providing security as 
previously mentioned, the military actively supported the GoSL’s reconstruction 
program. 
2. Reconstruction of the Conflict-Affected Areas 
As per Jabareen’s conceptualization of reconstruction, post-conflict reconstruction 
reduces the risk of conflict.342 Also, “relief and reconstruction is an extension of political, 
economic, and military strategy.”343 Having realized the importance of speedy 
reconstruction, the GoSL implemented two main development projects in the Northern 
and Eastern Provinces: “Negenahira Navodaya” and “Uthuru Wasanthaya.” The political 
strategy of the two projects was to integrate “ethnic minorities into the state and 
development” for consolidation of state power.344 The military was a key player in both 
the development projects and, therefore, these projects were subjected to criticism as an 
“ethno-nationalist and militarized fashion model.”345 The following paragraphs discuss 
the implication of the deployment of the military in this reconstruction. 
The GoSL initiated the Negenahira Navodaya project soon after gaining control in 
the area in 2007. It was an “accelerated three-year project” for the restoration of 
“normalcy in the Eastern Province.”346 The main focus of the project was the 
resettlement of IDPs and the development of infrastructure and livelihood to strengthen 
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the economic and social connectivity to the state’s development.347 For the purpose of 
security, the military established HSZs such as Sampur. The military played an important 
role in de-mining, providing assistance to civil authorities for infrastructure development 
and CIMIC tasks to assist the civilians to establish livelihood while providing security.  
Meanwhile, the GoSL initiated mechanisms to provide humanitarian assistance to 
the people who fled the LTTE-controlled areas in the Northern Province. In April 2009, 
with the flow of IDPs into the GoSL-controlled areas, the GoSL appointed the Chief of 
the Army Staff as the Competent Authority to provide humanitarian assistance to the 
IDPs.348 He coordinated the government institutions and the military while obtaining 
assistance from the INGOs to provide facilities to the IDPs. By the end of May 2009, the 
GoSL had to look after nearly 300,000 IDPs. There was a need to identify the former 
LTTE cadres mingled with the civilians, to de-mine, and to restore basic facilities prior to 
the resettlement.349 The Army played a pivotal role in the construction of relief villages 
called “welfare villages” with necessary facilities. Initially, the military assisted the 
civilian authorities in the administration of the welfare villages and later restricted them 
only for the provision of security. Also, the GoSL employed retired and mobilized 
military reserve personnel to handle the welfare villages. 
At the same time, the GoSL implemented a more comprehensive program for the 
resettlement of the IDPs. The Presidential Task Force (PTF) was formed in May 2009 
“for resettlement, development, and security in the Northern Province.”350 The PTF 
adopted a three-pronged approach entitled Uthuru Wasanthaya (the spring of the 
Northern Province). The approach consisted of providing humanitarian assistance and 
basic facilities before the resettlement, the establishment of a speedy recovery 
mechanism, and finally the development of infrastructure. It was a 180-day program 
conducted through a well-coordinated plan with the support of line ministries, external 
                                                 
347 Chaminda, “Uthuru Wasanthaya and Negenahira Navodaya.” 
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agencies, the UN system, and the INGOs while the Army was an active partner in the 
resettlement process.351 The major challenges for the program were de-mining and the 
restoration of basic facilities.  
The Army greatly contributed to the mitigation of the challenges for the rapid 
resettlement program. The Army Humanitarian De-mining Unit (HDU) took the leading 
role in de-mining, accounting for over 75 percent of the areas with assistance from NGOs 
and INGOs.352 Also, due to the lack of facilities in the resettlement, the military provided 
a head start by the reconstruction of roads and bridges, the renovation of public utilities, 
and even the construction of temporary shelters. With its own resources, the Army 
provided resettled people nearly 3,000 temporary houses.353 The UNHCR and the 
governments of India and China assisted the GoSL in providing material and financial 
support. The rapid resettlement progress was successful in accommodating 456,000 IDPs 
by December 2011.354 Also, during 2010, all the administrative institutions were 
functional while community-based organizations commenced to re-group.355   
Meanwhile, the GoSL faced another challenge in the rehabilitation of ex-
combatants and their reintegration in society. There were 11,664 ex-combatants who 
were to undergo the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process. The GoSL 
appointed a military major general as the Commissioner General for Rehabilitation to 
undertake this task and implemented a comprehensive plan to rehabilitate the ex-
combatants. This plan included the provision of education, birth and education 
certificates, vocational training, life skills training, counseling, and reintegration to civil 
society as lawful citizens. By May 2010, “all children formerly associated with armed 
groups had been released from rehabilitation centers and community–based reintegration 
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has started.”356 The Army played an important role in the process of rehabilitation and 
reintegration. Also, the Army conducted a number of welfare projects such as the 
donation of agricultural equipment and boat engines for the beneficiaries to establish their 
livelihoods.357  
The military’s continuing deployment in HSZs and security activities and the 
engagement in civilian spheres of work were subject to criticism, however. There was an 
allegation that the military had appropriated lands for security purposes and involvement 
in development, claiming the reconstruction process “securitized development.”358 
Further, the critics claimed the military’s inclusion in the development program was a 
detriment for civil society organizations to raise their ideas during the meeting to discuss 
matters related to the reconstruction process.359 Stone posits that the military dominated 
the PTF and it performed “unprecedented roles in what would normally be considered 
civilian matters.”360 While the militarization may have affected the freedom of civil 
society, the military’s active role assisted the civil authorities to accomplish the plans for 
development of the Northern and Eastern Provinces successfully. The United States 
“under Secretary of State for Political Affairs-Designate Thomas Shannon” stated in 
December 2015, “the success in rebuilding Sri Lanka and reconciling the people will be 
an example to the rest of the World.”361    
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3. State-wide Nation-Building  
At the same time, the GoSL deployed the military in statewide nation-building 
tasks.362 Given the difficulty in sudden reduction of military strength, the GoSL deployed 
the military for a wide variety of tasks seeking efficient use of the available resources. 
The military’s versatile skills, disciplined organizational structure, and resources allowed 
them to perform non-military duties.363 To respond to natural disasters was a major task 
for the military and it successfully fulfilled its responsibilities in these situations, such as 
the landslides in 2014 and floods during the monsoons. Also, the military played an 
active role in the beautification of cities under the Urban Development Authority (UDA), 
which was under the purview of the Ministry of Defense. Moreover, the military 
engineers undertook the construction of roads, buildings, and bridges, as well as 
earthmoving tasks, at the behest of the government. Moorcraft states, “The sappers were 
naturally happy to build things, especially bridges, but some of the regular infantry 
complained about being deployed as laborers on new roads.”364 In addition, the military 
was responsible for managing many public facilities such as the three international 
cricket stadiums. Given the recognition gained from the GoSL and the public, the GoSL 
entrusted the Army to conduct short leadership training programs for university entrants 
in the Army camps.365  
Meanwhile, the militarization resulted in the military’s entry into economic 
activities. While engaged in security and reconstruction tasks, the Army units continued 
small businesses and large-scale businesses such as running restaurants. Also, the GoSL 
employed the military in public sector posts and even in diplomatic appointments. The 
military’s expansion into the civilian sphere of business was the subject of wider 
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criticism, however. In January 2011, the JVP said that the GoSL has “ridiculed the 
military by assigning them to sell vegetables” and expressed that such activities “could be 
a step towards the militarization of the entire country in the future.”366  
In addition, in December 2013, the UNP Economic Affairs Spokesman, Dr. 
Harsha De Silva, commenting on the military, stated, “they are into construction, road 
maintenance, park maintenance, they are operating airlines, whale watching expeditions, 
golf courses, resorts…even have an outlet near parliament which sells rice packets.”367 
The military’s expansion resulted in the militarization of civil and political societies as 
well as the bureaucracy. As Stepan posits, the military’s engagement in state enterprises 
and fund raising activities becomes an impediment to democratic practices.368 The next 
section discusses the political developments that took place concurrent with the 
reconstruction process. 
C. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
Simultaneously, the restoration of democracy in the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces took place. After three decades, the Tamil political parties and the people in the 
Northern and Eastern Provinces could participate in politics, free from the LTTE’s 
intimidations. The TNA won 16 seats during the parliamentary elections in April 2010 
and secured 20 out of 25 councils in the Northern Province during the local government 
elections in 2011.369 Also, in the Northern Provincial Council (NPC) elections held in 
September 2013, the TNA won 30 out of 38 seats in the council. Goodhand states that 
victory in the elections allowed the TNA to consolidate its position as the primary 
representative of the Tamils.370 It provided the opportunity for the Tamils to advance 
their interests through the democratic process.  
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Critics posit that the NPC is not effective, however, because the presidentially 
appointed governor, an Army major general, can overrule the council decisions, and the 
council has to rely on the central government for funds to deliver political goods to their 
constituents.371 After the 2010 presidential elections, the GoSL appointed civilians as the 
governors of both the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Then, during the 2015 
parliamentary elections, the TNA secured 16 seats and its leader became the Leader of 
the Opposition, increasing the GoSL’s responsiveness toward Tamils.372 The increase of 
the number of political parties and voter turnout signifies the improvement of political 
freedom and security, as Table 8 shows. Despite the military’s role in providing the 
security that helped to improve the electoral democracy, the TNA’s main claims, besides 
the devolution of power to the NPC, were the de-militarization of the Northern 
Province.373 
Table 8.  Voter Turnout in Northern and Eastern Provinces: 2010–
2015 (as a Percentage of Total Registered Voters).374 
Province  
Election  
Jaffna Vanni Trincomalee Baticaloa Ampara 
2010 January Presidential 25.66 40.33 68.22 64.83 73.54 
2010 April Parliamentary 23.33 43.89 62.2 58.56 64.74 
2013 Provincial Council 73.17 64.15 66.83 64.29 66.83 
2015 January Presidential 72.57 66.28 76.76 70.97 77.39 
2015 August Parliamentary 61.56 71.89 74.34 69.11 73.99 
 
Conversely, the electoral process further strengthened the majority constituencies’ 
claim for increased securitization. The UPFA’s successive victories in presidential, 
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parliamentary, and local government elections became a strong popular mandate for 
maintaining the unitary structure of the state. Following President Rajapaksa’s reelection, 
the UPFA won 144 seats in parliamentary elections and 271 councils during the local 
governments’ elections in 2011.375 This overwhelming popular support for the UPFA 
marginalized the voice of the opposition and centralized power with the UPFA. The 
GoSL attempted to further increase power through the glorification of the military’s 
victory; the GoSL continued to promote the military as protectors of the nation and the 
popular support for it increased.376 As a result, a number of military officers entered into 
politics, militarizing politics and vice versa.  
Moreover, according to the majority public opinion, probing the alleged human 
rights violations became a betrayal of the military. Eventually, as discussed in the 
previous section, Sinhala nationalists opposed the devolution of power to the NPC, the 
set-up of any mechanism to investigate alleged war crimes, and reducing the military’s 
strength or its presence in the Northern and Eastern provinces.377 Eventually, 
militarization continued according to the will of the public opinion and thus, “the process 
of militarization of the political landscape has resulted in weakening the democratic 
institutions, mechanisms, and values.”378   
In the meantime, post-conflict economic growth was relatively high. Also, the 
GDP increased and reintegration of the Northern and Eastern provinces into the national 
economy contributed to the GDP. Acquisition of bonds and commercial loans with 
relatively high interest rates increased debt, however. This resulted in the depletion of 
foreign currency reserves and currency devaluation, and thus increased the cost of 
imports.379 Similarly, defense expenditures also increased due to the inclusion of the 
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UDA in the Ministry of Defense, but defense spending decreased as a percentage of 
GDP.380 Also, militarization continued to stabilize the economy as the main employer of 
the public sector. In summary, the militarization resulted in a defense economy in the 
country.  
Despite the increased centralization of power around President Rajapaksa, rising 
dissatisfaction among Sinhalese voters and even the SFP elites resulted in his defeat in 
the elections.381 By the mid-2010s, critics asserted that President Rajapaksa was moving 
toward authoritarianism, and economic constraints and the military’s heavy-handedness 
created dissatisfaction among Sinhalese voters and even SLFP elites.382 In the January 
2015 presidential election, SLFP’s General Secretary, Maithripala Sirisena, won the 
election and took office; with the victory, he also became the President of the SLFP. 
Subsequently, during the August 2015 general elections, the UNP-led United National 
Front for Good Governance (UNFGG) defeated the UPFA.383 The new President and 
Prime Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe established a National Unitary Government 
(NUG), which consisted of ministers from both the parties. The new NUG enacted 
several measures to reduce militarization, paving the way for democratic consolidation. 
Table 9 shows a summary of data gathered from the Economic Intelligence Unit’s 
Democracy Index. The next section discusses the effects of post-conflict militarization 
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Table 9.  Summary of Democracy Index: 2010–2015.384 
                     Year  
 













Rank 55 57 89 91 87 69 
Overall score 6.64 6.58 5.75 5.69 5.69 6.42 
Electoral process and pluralism 7 7 6.17 6.17 6.17 7.83 
Functioning of government 6.07 6.07 5.36 5.36 5.36 6.79 
Political participation 5 5 4.44 4.44 4.44 5 
Political culture 6.88 6.88 6.88 6.88 6.88 6.88 
Civil liberties 8.24 7.94 5.88 5.59 5.59 5.59 
Note: Democracy index gives different explanations to successive years. 2010—
democracy in retreat, 2011—democracy under stress, 2011 - democracy at a standstill, 
2012—democracy in limbo, 2014—democracy and its discontents, and 2015—
democracy in an age of anxiety. 
 
D. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
Balancing the relationship between the civil authorities and the military hierarchy 
continues to be a delicate operation. This is especially true as Sri Lanka recovers from the 
challenges of the protracted conflict, while still relying heavily on the military to help 
with the return to normalcy, as discussed at the beginning of the chapter. The continuing 
military engagement in the day-to-day affairs of the civil society affects the civil-military 
relations. This section discusses the developments of the democratic civilian control of 
the military and the effectiveness of the military during post-conflict situation.   
1. Democratic Civilian Control of the Military 
Sri Lanka has managed to maintain the democratic civilian control of the military, 
unlike many other countries. This is particularly important due to the protracted conflict, 
which gave the military huge popularity and respect from the public. The successive 
governments exercised the control of the military in different degrees. The following 
paragraphs discuss the evolution of Institutional control mechanisms, oversight, and 
professionalism of the military.        
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a. Institutional Control Mechanisms 
The President continued to exercise executive control over the military. President 
Rajapaksa’s re-election to office with 58% of the popular vote consolidated executive 
control. Also, the Secretary of Defense’s continuing interface between the President and 
the service commanders, and close links with the military elite, further strengthened the 
executive control.385 The increased power enjoyed by the military elite in decision-
making during the humanitarian operations, however, resulted in the emergence of the 
military as “a quasi-independent force with substantial support of the Sinhala segment of 
the population.”386 Eventually, this resulted in General Fonseka seeking to further 
increase military strength and “not only the coordination of the activities of three forces 
and police but full control over them.”387 Later, General Fonseka, dissatisfied over the 
rejection of his requests by the executive, entered politics.  
The GoSL’s heavy reliance on the military in post-conflict reconstruction resulted 
in a division between civilian and military leadership within months of the end of the 
conflict. The GoSL promoted the three service commanders to four-star generals in 
appreciation of their contribution to the defeat of the LTTE. Also, the Army Commander, 
General Sarath Fonseka, was appointed as the Chief of the Defense Staff (CDS), with 
wider powers for coordination of the military.388 In December 2009, General Fonseka 
resigned from military service and ran for the presidency in 2010 under an alliance led by 
the UNP.389 President Rajapaksa won the election, illustrating his popularity and the 
powerful influence of Sinhalese-Buddhists’ rural values.390  
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The GoSL “feared that Fonseka was conspiring to lead a coup attempt.”391 The 
reelected President Rajapaksa put General Fonseka on trial on charges of engaging in 
politics while in uniform and for alleged irregularities in military procurements; the trial 
sentenced General Fonseka to a 30-month prison term and deprived him of his civil rights 
and credentials earned during his military career. General Fonseka was further sentenced 
to a three-year prison term based on the accusation of the Secretary of Defense of war 
crimes.392 Also, the GoSL forced 12 military officers into compulsory retirement based 
on their alleged support of General Fonseka. Despite the GoSL’s actions against the 
former military commander, who led the battle in the field, the military remained loyal to 
civilian authorities.393 General Fonseka’s arrest later and the lack of reaction from the 
military confirmed the strength of the existing structure as a barrier to possible military 
coup.  
President Sirisena also continued the executive control; he made several changes 
to improve institutional control, as well. The MOD and the NSC remain the primary 
institutions that control and oversee the military. During the Rajapaksa administration, 
the MOD expanded its purview by including the UDA. The GoSL renamed the JOH as 
the Office of the Chief of Defense Staff (OCDS). Also, the state’s protocol list continued 




 positions after the 
Attorney General, ensuring the supremacy of civilian bureaucracy.394 President Sirisena 
further strengthened the military’s subservience to civilian authorities by appointing civil 
administrative officers such as the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the State 
Intelligence Service (SIS), while creating a new portfolio of State Minister of Defense. 
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394 OMICS International, “Sri Lankan Order of Precedence,” accessed November 6, 2016. 
http://research.omicsgroup.org/index.php/Sri_Lankan_order_of_precedence. 
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Also, the Police Department reverted back to the purview of the Ministry of Interior, Rule 
of Law, and Public Order. The legislature still did not have control over military affairs, 
however.  
b. Oversight of the Military 
Meanwhile, the oversight of the military showed an improvement. The legislature 
continued its marginal oversight over the defense budget while the Auditor General 
Department continued oversight of the handling of public funds. Also, the Supreme Court 
and the Human Rights Commission exercised their oversight through inquiring into 
complaints against the military personnel about their executive actions. There were critics 
on the restriction of oversight by the media and civil society organizations during the 
Rajapaksa administration.395 Today, however, they enjoy a relatively free environment to 
oversee the activities of the security sector.   
c. Professional Norms 
In the meantime, the development of military professionalism steadily increased. 
The MOD continued to exercise control over the enlistment, promotion, service 
extension, overseas leave, and retirement of the military officer corps, while the scope of 
military training considerably improved. The local military training, the opportunities to 
obtain academic qualification from recognized universities, the number of military 
personnel following overseas training, and the number of Sri Lankan and foreign officers 
attending the DSCSC significantly increased.396 Also, since 2011, the military officers 
had the opportunity to follow master’s degree programs at the prestigious Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS). In addition, Sri Lanka commenced several multi-national 
exercises: “Cormorant Strike,” “Mitra Shakti” with the Indian military, and “Silk Route” 
with the Chinese military. Moreover, Sri Lanka began to conduct annual international 
                                                 
395 International Crisis Group, “Sri Lanka: Jumpstarting the Reform Process,” 28. 
396 For instance, since 2007, 882 officers completed the Command and Staff course until 2016. 98 Sri 
Lankan officers and 15 foreign officers graduated in December 2015. Ministry of Defence Sri Lanka, 




military seminars: the Army’s “Defense Seminar,” the Navy’s “Galle Dialogue,” and the 
KDU’s “Defense Symposium.” These events significantly contributed to the development 
of the military’s professionalism.   
Increased engagement in non-military duties, however, also affected the military 
professionalism. The close interaction with politicians while performing CIMIC and 
personal protection duties led to the politicization of the military.397 Also, the 
prerogatives such as posting of retired military elites in higher offices in the public sector 
and diplomatic appointments influenced them to develop links with politicians, eroding 
the norms of military professionalism.398 If the alternate governments continue to appoint 
personnel to the officer corps based on political alliances, the military will continue to be 
politicized. In addition, the performance of non-military tasks, such as labor in 
construction, the cleaning of roads, and commercial activities has eroded the military’s 
image.399 Also, due to the lack of a proper de-mobilization program, the retired or 
deserted military personnel tend to engage in crimes, further tarnishing the military’s 
image.  
The new government implemented several measures for further improvement of 
the military’s professionalism. The new State Minister of Defense portfolio’s 
responsibility focuses on the development of military professionalism. The military’s 
engagement in non-military tasks was restricted and the police and the Police Special 
Task Force became responsible for the security of the politicians. Also, the military 
elite’s second careers in public sector appointments have been reduced. The mechanisms 
for institutional control and development of professionalism have had effects on the 
military’s effectiveness.    
                                                 
397 Veena Gill, “India,” 181. 
398 Among eleven points, Alfred Stepan’s sixth prerogative suggests that employment of military 
personnel in senior civil appointments can create various levels of instability in different sectors. Alfred 
Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1988), 94–97.   
399 Alfred Stepan’s tenth prerogative suggests that the military employment in state enterprise can 
create various levels of instability in different sectors. Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics, 94–97. 
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2. Effectiveness of the Military 
The military significantly developed its effectiveness during the protracted 
conflict with the LTTE. The previously discussed dynamics of the strategic environment 
demanded the continuing military assistance for post-conflict reconstruction. Also, the 
sudden down-size of the military was not possible due to socio-economic and political 
reasons. As a result, the military maintained its strength and capabilities while getting 
more opportunities to develop its professionalism. Further, the experience gained in the 
conflict helped the military to develop strategies to face future internal conflicts and to 
share their experience with foreign militaries. The following paragraphs discuss the plans 
and structures of the military and the commitment of resources for it.   
a. Plans: Doctrines and Strategies 
The military needs to define its mission and roles in the present context. The 
defeat of the LTTE formally ended the military’s counter-terrorism mission; 
reconstruction and nation-building roles ended when the civilian sector took over. In this 
context, the military needs a careful design of its mission and roles in order to maintain 
effectiveness. The future military mission and roles need to derive from the national 
security strategy that takes into account the current and future strategic environment. The 
Sri Lankan Defense sector began developing strategies and doctrines. The MOD took 
steps to formulate the national security strategy, the OCDS began to formulate a Joint 
Operations doctrine and the three services formulated respective tactical-level doctrines. 
All these strategies and plans should contribute to the fulfillment of desired military 
objectives, ultimately coinciding with national interests.  
b. Organizational Structures 
The defense planning structures and process continued to be the same with minor 
developments. The MOD and the NSC continued as the principal elements of national 
security planning and co-ordination of agencies. The OCDS coordinated its joint 
operational matters with the three branches of the armed services and the Coastal Guards. 
The Navy, however, increased interoperability by establishing military-cooperation with 
Indian, Maldivian and other navies of the Indian Ocean Rim to mitigate maritime 
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challenges. In addition, the military increased its role in UN Peace Keeping missions. 
Several military officers had the opportunity to serve as staff officers at the UN 
Headquarters in New York and the number of military contingents increased.  
Meanwhile, the military needs to balance its ethnic group representation. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the military’s composition is overwhelmingly 
Sinhalese. Balanced ethnic group representation in the military is paramount to the 
development of its effectiveness. The disproportionate composition of the military may 
lead other ethnic groups to question the military’s legitimacy. Also, as in the past, the 
military may be perceived as an occupation force by minority ethnic groups, when 
deployed in areas dominated by them. Furthermore, the military personnel need 
encouragement to enhance the tri-linguistic capability to be effective in internal security 
and disaster response missions statewide.  
c. Commitment of Resources 
At the same time, the resource commitment to the military steadily declined. The 
defense budget increased, but the UDA and recurrent expenditures such as pay and 
allowances consume a large portion of it. Also, the enlistment/recruitment rates decreased 
in comparison to the number of personnel who retired or deserted the service. As a result, 
the organizations became ineffective because of the lack of personnel to fill the 
vacancies, particularly in the Army. The island-wide deployment increased the 
requirement of infrastructure and other facilities. The Army units continue to lack funds 
for sustenance and facilities such as infrastructure and transportation, however. This was 
the primary reason for the Army to engage in commercial activities. Rather than 
continuing with partially filled military units, it would be ideal to have the essential 
number of units by the amalgamation of units and demobilization. Obviously, this would 
be a politically sensitive decision and therefore, it is essential to have a plan to provide 
job opportunities or to pay substantial compensation to the demobilized personnel. This 
may be costly in the short term, but would definitely result in improvement of the CMR 
and thus democratization as a whole. 
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E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The end of three decades of destructive terrorism gave Sri Lanka the opportunity 
for consolidating democracy. Given the dynamics of the existing strategic environment, 
however, it was essential to maintain the military’s surveillance to prevent the resurgence 
of LTTE terrorism. Meanwhile, the military was deployed in the reconstruction of the 
Northern and Eastern Provinces, and nation building statewide. In the short-term, 
continuing militarization was successful in the decline of the LTTE’s possible 
resurgence. It contributed to the successful implementation of reconstruction programs 
and thus helped democratic consolidation. In the longer term, however, continuing 
militarization in the absence of a credible armed threat became an impediment to the 
development of democratic institutions, which negatively affected the consolidation of 
democracy. 
Meanwhile, continuing militarization affected the democratic CMR. The military 
had been a lucrative resource available for civilian authorities to fill the vacuums in a 
bureaucracy, which is supportive to attain governmental policies, and effective 
organizations to address immediate political issues. Thus, militarization helped to 
maintain political as well as economic stability, impressing civilian authorities. Also, the 
deployment in construction and management roles improved the technical and managerial 
skills of the military personnel. In addition, interaction with the civilians developed the 
military’s sense of public responsiveness. The adequate manpower facilitated the release 
of military personnel for peacekeeping duties as per demand. Conversely, continuing 
deployment in mostly the civilian sphere of business at the behest of civilian authorities 
led to the decline of the military’s image. Also, militarization in the absence of potential 
armed threat led to questioning the legitimacy of the military by the public. Moreover, the 
overwhelming Sinhala composition of the military reduced the military’s legitimacy as a 
national force when deployed in security missions in minority-dominated areas. 
At the same time, post-conflict militarization has been a point for mobilization for 
both Sinhala and ethno-nationalist politics. Also, glorification of the military victory led 
to the militarization of society and a political focus on ethnic divisions. This resulted in 
an ethnic insulation that severely undermined the prospects for national reintegration, 
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which is paramount for the consolidation of democracy. Meanwhile, militarization led to 
the politicization of the military, which severely affected its professionalism and further 
divided the military’s political loyalties. Thus, the military deployment in post-conflict 
reconstruction resulted in short-term positive effects towards democratic consolidation, 
yet had both a positive and a negative impact on the democratic CMR. The next chapter 
will analyze the effects of the military’s deployment for internal projects working toward 
democratic consolidation and the CMR from 1948 to 2016. 
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V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
A. ANALYSIS 
How does post-conflict militarization affect the democratization of Sri Lanka? 
This chapter analyzes how the deployment of the military in different missions and roles 
affected the democratic consolidation and the CMR to derive the two aspects of the 
research problem. First is the effects of the militarization toward the “five arenas of a 
consolidated democracy,” as proposed by Linz and Stepan.400 Second is the effects of 
militarization toward the democratic civilian control and effectiveness of the military as 
per the new conceptualization of CMR by Bruneau and Matei.401  
The analysis used the tasks performed by the military in different missions during 
the previously discussed different time periods.402 The effects are measured as positive 
(P), negative (N), more positive and less negative (PN), more negative and less positive 
(NP), and not relevant (-). The Sri Lankan case uniquely illustrates that the initial 
deployment of the military in post-conflict reconstruction was not detrimental to 
democratization.403 This research finds that deployment of the military in post-conflict 
reconstruction resulted in more positive effects in the short term and more negative 
effects in the longer term toward democratization. Also, given the military’s dependency 
on procurements of military equipment from foreign countries, this research confirms the 
influence of external variables to the CMR, as mentioned in Chapter I.404   
                                                 
400 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan propose five arenas of a consolidated democracy, which is 
described in Chapter I. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation, 7.   
401 Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei’s new conceptualization of CMR is described in 
Chapter I. Florina Cristiana Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” 28.  
402 As discussed in the previous chapters, the political developments resulted in different military 
missions and roles, and the military’s deployment in those tasks had both positive and negative effects 
towards democratization. 
403 Hashim asserts that “militaries are not effective development agencies…the spread of the military 
into domains beyond its purview poses the serious danger…to interfere in the political process.” Hashim, 
When Counterinsurgency Wins, 203, 204. 
404 Desch, Civilian Control of the Military, 1. 
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1. Military Missions, Roles, and used Military Effects 
The different military effects during varying roles provide a basis to analyze the 
effects of militarization toward democratization.405 The citizens who used violence 
against the state became adversaries and those under the military’s administration became 
clients of the military during internal and national security missions. Table 10s 
summarizes the military’s missions and roles resultant from critical political 
developments from 1948 to 1990.  
Table 10.  Missions and Roles Performed by the Military: 1948–1990. 
Time 
Frame 
Military Mission Military’s Roles Used Military effects 
1948 -1971 
Assist the police to 
maintain law and 
order 
 Anti-illicit emigration                    
 Protest/riot control 
 Aid to civil powers 
 Deterrence, Prevention 
         
 Deterrence, Suppression 
1971 -1972 Internal Security 
 Fight JVP 
insurrection                    
 Aid to civil powers 
 Deterrence,                 
  Suppression, Destroy 
 Deterrence, Suppression 
1972-1977 
Assist the police to 
maintain law and 
order 
 Anti-illicit emigration                    
 Protest/riot control 
 Aid to civil powers 
 Deterrence, Prevention 
 
 Deterrence, Suppression 
Internal Security 
 Fight Tamil’s 
militarism                   
 Aid to civil powers 
 Deterrence, Suppression 
1977-1983 Internal Security 
 Fight Tamil 
separatism                  
 Aid to civil powers 
 Deterrence, Suppression,           
  Defeat, Destroy 




 Fight Tamil 
separatism 
 Fight JVP 
insurrection                
 Aid to civil powers 
 Deterrence, Suppression,           
   Defeat, Destroy 
 Deterrence, Suppression 
 
Table 10 shows the gradual militarization of Sri Lanka in response to the 
insurgencies. From 1948 until the 1970s the country had been a de-militarized society. 
                                                 
405 Military effects are what the military do to achieve the desired end of the military strategy. 
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The primary mission of the military was anti-illicit immigration; protest and riot control, 
and assisting civil powers to maintain essential services during strikes, were the 
secondary roles. Although the military performed the latter two tasks under emergency 
law, the use of force was limited to deterrence and suppression as shown in the table. The 
military’s use of force increased during the counterinsurgency operations against the JVP 
insurrection in 1971. The entire country, except for the Northern and Eastern Provinces, 
became militarized during this insurrection. Since 1972, the Tamil militants also used 
violence and the military had to use greater force to maintain law and order. The 1979 
PTA provided more impunity and autonomy for the military to fight terrorism, thus 
increasing the militarization.  
Consequently, the escalation of the Tamil separatist insurgency in 1983 
strengthened the base for the militarization of the state. Both the Tamil militant groups’ 
domination and the military’s deployment and counterinsurgency operations increased 
the militarization in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Further, the conflict between the 
GoSL and the Tamil militants became internationalized, due to the flow of Sri Lankan 
refugees to other countries and the emergence of the external actor, the Tamil diaspora, to 
fight on another front against the GoSL. Also, as discussed in previous chapters, the 
Tamil diaspora became the lifeline of the LTTE, providing ideological, logistical, and 
international support. In addition, the government of Tamil Nadu supported the separatist 
movements in Sri Lanka while gathering international support against the GoSL. Thus, 
the GoSL’s focus changed from internal security to national security. Eventually, in the 
late 1980s, the use of violence by the JVP insurrection, the LTTE’s terrorism, and the 
GoSL’s counterinsurgency campaigns led to the militarization of the entire country.  
By the 1990s, due to the magnitude of the separatist threat from the LTTE, 
national security became paramount for Sri Lanka. The successive governments’ policies in 
response to the LTTE threat resulted in the increase of militarization after the 1990s, as 
shows in Table 11. The LTTE became the sole Tamil terrorist group fighting to gain a 
separate state and expanded its activities island-wide. In response, the military also grew in 
strength and deployed statewide, particularly in the Northern and Eastern provinces. Thus, 
given the expansion of militarization, violence became an accepted norm in the society. Also, 
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the growth of the military’s strength and development of civil society organizations that 
encouraged the use of violence increased the military culture in the state. Further, the 
increased number of deserters from military service became a societal problem in the 
militarized society. Meanwhile, the military used aid to civil power and civil affairs as 
strategies to strengthen the GoSL’s control in Northern and Eastern Provinces.  









 Fight the LTTE 
 Aid to civil powers   
 Defeat, Destroy 




 Fight the LTTE 
 Protections of 
politicians 
 Civil Affairs (Jaffna)                   
 Aid to civil powers 
 Defeat, Destroy              
 Surveillance, Deterrence,    
 Suppression 
Winning hearts and minds 
 Deterrence, Suppression 
2002-2006 
Assist the police 
to maintain law 
and order 
 Civil Affairs (Jaffna)                   
 
 Aid to civil powers 
Winning hearts and minds 
 
 Deterrence, Suppression 
National 
Security 
 Defense against the 
LTTE                   




 Fight the LTTE 
 Protections of 
politicians 
 Civil Affairs (Jaffna)                   
 Aid to civil powers 
 Defeat, Destroy              
 Surveillance, Deterrence,    
 Suppression 
Winning hearts and minds 
 Deterrence, Suppression 
 
In the meantime, the LTTE used the CFA to regain its fighting power, particularly 
during the 2002 CFA period, taking advantage of the military’s defensive posture. The 
LTTE’s growth of military power and terrorist activities amidst the CFA put Sri Lanka’s 
national security at risk. In response, the GoSL commenced military operations to defeat 
the LTTE in 2006. The time period from July 2006 to May 2009 has been the most 
militarized duration of the country, as shown in the table. The military’s offensive 
operations against the LTTE, the LTTE’s terrorist attacks throughout the country, and the 
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majority Sinhalese public support to the military all resulted in the highest ever 
militarized duration of the country’s history.      
Despite the defeat of the LTTE, the GoSL continued the militarization. Given the 
dynamics of the strategic environment discussed in Chapter IV, the GoSL did not embark 
on an immediate de-militarization because security was paramount for the post-conflict 
reconstruction process.406 Table 12 shows the missions and  roles performed and the 
effects used by the military during post-conflict reconstruction period. 










 Prevent revival of the 
LTTE 
 Counter non-traditional 
threats 
 Protection for politicians   
 Surveillance, 
Deterrence, 
 Suppression     
State-building 
 Aid to civil authorities 
for reconstruction of 




 Assist civil authorities 
for infrastructure 
construction, maintain 
public facilities, and 
social services 
 Provide leadership  
training 
 Community relations 
projects 
 
Assist the police 
to maintain law 
and order 
 Protest/Riot Control 
 Aid to civil powers  Deterrence, Suppression 
2015 
onwards 
Assist the police 
to maintain law 
and order 
 Aid to civil powers  Deterrence, Suppression 
                                                 
406 According to Jabareen, security and order come first in the sequencing of post-conflict 
reconstruction because “although it may freeze the conflict temporarily, it will not prevent it from 
reemerging in the near future.” Jabareen, “Conceptualizing Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” 114.   
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Also, given the military’s availability in location, resources, and skills in versatile 
fields, such as construction, demining, and management, its support was important for the 
civil authorities to reconstruct the conflict-affected Northern and Eastern provinces.407 
The continuation of security is a reason to deny the revival of the LTTE, as mentioned in 
the previous chapter. Also, the military was not required to use force in relation to the 
period from 1977 to 2009, as shown in Tables 6, 7, and 8.  
Thus, by 2012, the military had to disengage from its roles in aid of civil power 
because the police and civil authorities were able to operate the administrative 
machinery. Moreover, the GoSL lifted the emergency law in November 2011 due to the 
absence of the threat of revival of the LTTE. The military continued its presence in the 
Northern and Eastern Provinces and in countrywide nation-building roles, however. The 
next section analyzes the effects of militarization toward democratic consolidation and 
the CMR.    
2. Effects of Militarization toward Democratic Consolidation 
The deployment of the military in post-conflict reconstruction affects democratic 
consolidation. Continuing security is paramount for the reconstruction programs because 
the end of the conflict does not mark the end of security threats immediately, as discussed 
in Chapter I. Also, the military has to perform a vital role in assisting civil authorities 
until the restoration of normalcy. Moreover, there is no clear line between the 
responsibilities of the military and the civil authorities as discussed in Chapter I. In this 
context, Table 13 shows the effects of the deployment of the military in different roles 
toward democratic consolidation.  
 
                                                 
407 According to Joint Plan for Assistance Northern Province 2011, by the end of 2011, the GoSL 
together with international and local partners completed a major portion of the rehabilitation and 
reintegration of ex-combatants, de-mining, and resettlement of IDPs. Government of Sri Lanka, United 
Nations & Partners, “Joint Action Plan for Assistance: Northern Province 2011.” 
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Table 13. Effects of the Military’s Different Roles toward 
Democratic Consolidation. 










Ceremonial duties - - - - - - 
Disaster / strike response - NP - - P NP 
Protest/Riot control - N N N - N 
Anti-illicit immigration P - - P - PN 
Fight the JVP P PN PN PN PN P 
Aid to civil powers - NP N - P N 
Fight the LTTE P PN PN PN PN P 
Protection of politicians - - -(2) -(2) - - 




P NP NP NP P NP 
Assist Reconstruction of 
North and East 




 Maintain public 
facilities 
 Social services 
 Provide leadership 
training 
 Community relations 
projects 
- - - - P N 
- - - - - N 
- NP N - - N 
- NP - - - - 
- NP - - - N 
Notes: Consolidation of state’s sovereignty. Use of security personnel for political 
purposes negatively affects the arena. 
a. Before and During the Conflict between the GoSL and the LTTE  
Since 1948, the military has performed different missions. Counterinsurgency, 
crime prevention, humanitarian assistance, and PSO were the macro roles, and they 
contained a number of micro roles.408 Those roles, which are listed in Table 10, had 
                                                 
408 Military missions come under six categories: “external and internal wars, counter terrorism, crime 
prevention, humanitarian assistance, and peace support operations (PSO).” Matei, “A New 
Conceptualization.” 31.  
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differently affected the prerequisite and five arenas of the democratic consolidation 
process. It was a result of variation in the degree of use of force in achieving previously 
discussed desired military effects. The military frequently performed search and rescue 
tasks during disasters, strengthening the bureaucracy, but continuing involvement in 
damage mitigation undermined the development of civil society organizations’ and 
bureaucracy’s capacity to respond to disasters.  
Civil society organizations, such as labor or trade unions and different interest 
groups that represent religious, ethnic, and linguistic values, must have the freedom to 
express their dissent. It is the responsibility of the police to control the protests or riots to 
maintain law and order. The call for the military’s assistance does mean that the police 
had exhausted its force. When the military engage in riot or protest control, the degree of 
use of force was relatively high and it negatively affected all arenas; the use of the 
military to maintain essential services such as harbors, postal and transport services 
during strikes, however, positively affected the economy. Also, anti-illicit immigration 
duties positively affected the consolidation of the state’s sovereignty and rule of law as it 
prevented the change of the country’s demography by unlawful means; it negatively 
affected the development of the capacity of bureaucracy, however. The law enforcement 
agencies tend to rely on the military rather than developing capabilities to perform their 
duties.  
The military’s counterinsurgency roles during the JVP insurrections in 1971 and 
1987–1990, and the LTTE’s separatism from 1983 to 2009, helped to consolidate the 
state’s sovereignty and more positively affected all five arenas. The autonomy and 
impunity with special powers given under the emergency law and the 1979 PTA 
negatively affected the freedom of civil society, autonomy of the political society and the 
rule of law, however. Also, as discussed in previous chapters, the conflict between the 
GoSL and the LTTE resulted in the increase of the defense budget. The increase of the 
defense budget decreased the allocations for economic development activities, such as 
infrastructure development and poverty alleviation, thus negatively affecting the 
economy. Conversely, defense expenditures helped to keep the South of the country in 
peace, giving an impression to local and international business communities of a stable 
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economy.409 Further, the military has become the main public sector employer, helping to 
stabilize the economies in agricultural and rural districts. Thus, militarization created 
positive effects for the economy.       
The military aid to civil powers, civil affairs, and the protection of vulnerable 
persons created short-term positive and long-term negative effects. During an insurgency, 
when a government’s control is established in an area, it is the responsibility of the 
military to perform tasks such as maintenance of law and order, coordination of 
administrative matters, and assistance to civilians to establish livelihood. Hence, 
immediately after establishing the GoSL’s control, the military’s performance of such 
tasks in the North and East, particularly in Jaffna, positively affected the civil society, 
economy, and bureaucracy. The military has to disengage from these tasks, however, as 
the civilian authorities gain or regain their capacity to undertake such responsibilities as 
are under their purview. Thus, the military’s continuation of such tasks became an 
obstacle to the development of civil and political societies, economy, and the 
bureaucracy. Also, the military’s protection of politicians in the absence of a credible 
threat, and the use of security personnel by the politicians in their political tasks, severely 
affected the civil and political societies and the rule of law.410  
b. Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
The continuation of security created both positive and negative effects to 
democratic consolidation. In the short term it created positive affects to all arenas, but 
negative effects to most arenas in the longer run. As discussed in the previous chapters, 
continuing security is paramount to prevent the reemergence of insurgency, providing 
protection to the reconstruction process. The military continued security duties in a 
relatively low degree; however, there was no credible indication or intelligence on 
resurgence of the LTTE and emergency law was lifted in November 2011. Thus, the 
deterrence created by the presence of the military negatively affected the civil and 
                                                 
409 Saroja Selvanathan and Eliyathamby A. Selvanathan, “Defense Expenditure and Economic 
Growth,” 76. 
410 During the 2001 elections, Deputy Defense Minister Ratwatte used his security personnel for 
political purposes. De Silva, Sri Lanka and the Defeat of the LTTE, 230. 
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political societies, the rule of law, and bureaucracy. As discussed in the previous 
chapters, deployment of the military under emergency law and the PTA restricts the 
freedoms of the citizen and gives impunity to the military. Also, continuing security led 
critics to describe Sri Lanka as a national security state; this negatively affected the 
economy due to the conditions laid by Western countries in giving economic 
concessions, such as tariff relief for exportation of garments to the Europe .411  
The military’s deployment in the Northern and Eastern provinces to assist 
reconstruction created positive effects and negative effects in the longer run. The military 
was an active partner in the reconstruction program that consisted of Uthuru Wasanthaya, 
Negenahira Udanaya, and the 5R strategy. As discussed previously, these projects came 
to an end by 2012 and there was no requirement of the military’s assistance. Hence, the 
military’s continuing presence and deployment in HSZs created negative effects toward 
all arenas. 
The military’s deployment in nation-building tasks created short-term positive 
and longer-term more effects that are negative. Tasks such as the construction of 
infrastructure and the maintenance of public facilities are civilian works. When the 
military engaged in such tasks, it undermined the development of civil organizations, as 
civil organizations cannot compete with the military’s ability to produce results with low 
cost; this is because the military uses its own resources, which are maintained by the 
public funds. Also, the maintenance of public facilities, such as cricket stadiums and 
jogging paths, are civilian tasks. The deployment of the military in such tasks 
undermined the development of civilian bureaucracy.  
Further, due to the popularity of the military, civil organizations and schools 
frequently sought the military’s assistance to conduct leadership lectures and programs. 
This helped to develop civil society. The conduct of leadership training programs for the 
university entrants negatively affected the civil society, however, because those programs 
were not a request of the university students. Also, those programs were criticized as the 
                                                 
411 Neil DeVotta, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Lost Quest for Separatism in Sri 
Lanka,” Asian Survey 49 (2009): 1048, accessed February 29, 2016, http://jstor.org/stable/10.1525/
as.2009.49.6.1021. 
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GoSL’s effort to undermine the university students’ organizations. Those training 
programs helped the trainees to organize themselves, however, thus encouraging their 
participation in societal activities. 
The military’s participation in social services and community relations projects 
created both positive and negative effects. The military assisted the civil authorities in 
social services such as dengue awareness programs. It helped civil society organizations 
to strengthen themselves to perform their responsibilities. Conversely, it resulted in the 
civil society organizations’ dependency on the military. Also, the military provided 
assistance to the schools, religious and charity organizations to organize their functions. 
Eventually, most of those organizations became dependent on the military and considered 
that such tasks are the military’s responsibility. Conversely, the military engaged in the 
search and perform CIMIC tasks, particularly in the Northern and Eastern provinces. 
These events undermined the development of civil society organizations that are 
responsible to take up those matters.   
3. Effects of Militarization toward Democratic Civil-Military Relations 
The deployment of the military in internal missions, particularly during post-
conflict reconstruction, affects democratic CMR. The continuing security and the 
military’s engagement in day-to-day affairs of Sri Lanka’s civil society, result in the 
military’s popularity among the public and, conversely, the decline of its image in the 
absence of a credible security threat. In this context, Table 14 shows the effects of 
deployment of the military in different roles toward democratic CMR. 
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Ceremonial duties - - P - - - 
Disaster /strike response P - NP P - - 
Protest/Riot control P - N - P P 
Anti-illicit immigration P - - - - - 
Fight the JVP P NP PN P P P 
Aid to civil powers - - - - - - 
Fight the LTTE P NP PN P P P 
Protection of politicians - N N - - - 
Civil Affairs -  NP P P - 
Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
Continuing Security (statewide) NP PN PN P P P 
Assist Reconstruction of North 
and East 
- N NP - - P 
Assist Nation-building 
 Infrastructure construction 
 Maintain public facilities 
 Social services 
 Provide leadership training 
 Community relations projects 
- - - - - P 
- - NP - - - 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
- - - - - - 
 
a. Before and During the Conflict between the GoSL and the LTTE 
The military’s deployment in strike and disaster responses created positive and 
negative effects to the CMR. Strike responses only resulted in the negative effects to 
professional norms because the military performed those tasks against their professional 
responsibilities at the behest of the GoSL. The civil authorities heavily rely on the 
military in disaster response. That is because the military always becomes the first 
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respondents in search and rescue tasks. Also, the military developed plans to assist civil 
authorities in disaster management.  
The JVP insurrections and the LTTE’s separatism significantly affected the 
civilian control of the military. Given the threat posed by those insurgencies, the civilian 
leadership exerted greater civilian control of the military. The autonomy and impunity 
received by the military during these insurgencies resulted in the media and civil society 
organizations increasing oversight over the military’s actions. The President’s executive 
powers, however, imposed restrictions on the media and NGOs for oversight. Also, the 
legislature, judiciary, and other public organizations did not have powers to exercise 
considerable oversight given the authority of the President. The military developed 
professional norms—expertise, sense of responsibility, and corporateness—through 
increased training and the experience gained, particularly during three decades of fighting 
with the LTTE. The politicization and ethnicization of the military during the conflict 
negatively affected professionalism, however. Politicization created a divided military 
affecting its political neutrality while ethnicization affected its impartiality.      
Additionally, the insurgencies significantly affected the military effectiveness. As 
discussed in previous chapters, the GoSL paid attention to develop military effectiveness 
after the 1971 JVP insurrection. The conflict between the GoSL and the LTTE was the 
main reason to increase military effectiveness, particularly after the 1990s. At the time of 
final operations, the military developed doctrines, strategies, and military structures 
suited to counter the LTTE. Also, the commitment of resources was high to facilitate the 
structural changes and plans of the military. The country’s dependency on foreign 
assistance for military procurement, however, has been a significant factor affecting the 
military effectiveness. Thus, the ability of the GoSL to acquire military equipment 
became a variable in the CMR of Sri Lanka. Further, the increased effectiveness, military 
strength and defense budget resulted in the increase of militarization of the country. 
The military’s protection for politicians negatively affected professionalism 
because it led to politicization of the military and also the politicians to abuse the 
military. The military’s role in civil affairs, however, had more positive effects toward 
the CMR. Frequent association with the politicians during civil affairs admittedly lead to 
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politicizing the military while it helps to enhance military expertise in specific skills such 
as construction and management. Also, the Army developed plans and structures to 
perform civil affairs tasks at the behest of the government.   
b. Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
The deployment of the military in post-conflict reconstruction continued to affect 
civilian control over the military. The defeat of the LTTE terminated the military’s three 
decades of military missions. Counterinsurgency and continuation of security legitimized 
the military’s existence without downsizing. Also, the continuation of security more 
positively affected the CMR, as shown in Table 9. Although General Fonseka’s issue 
created tensions on civilian control, the situation became normal. As discussed in 
previous chapters, given the powers of the executive President, civilian control of the 
military remains strong and the possibility for a military coup to succeed is unlikely.  
The legislature’s oversight of the military continued to remain weak, however, 
while judiciary exercise limited oversight. Also, the GoSL’S glorification of the military 
victory and the popularity of the military among the public contributed to restrict the 
oversight by media and civil organizations. Later, oversight of the military increased with 
the change of governments in 2015. Further, establishment of parliamentary committees 
to examine and review military procurements and expenditure, and creation of more 
proactive judiciary and military justice mechanisms would enhance the oversight of the 
military. Additionally, given the increase of the military’s strength, it is necessary to 
create a sizable civilian defense and strategic experts who are conversant on national 
security issues.   
The continuing training process led to the further development of professionalism. 
The KDU and the DSCSC and other training institutes increased their facilities and the 
number of foreign training opportunities also increased. The multinational exercises and 
international seminars mentioned in Chapter IV, and increased PSOs, further developed 
the military’s interoperability. Politicization of the military continued to affect its 
political neutrality, however. The new government established the State Ministry of 
Defense, which has the purview of the DSCSC, Defense College, and the Cadet Corps. 
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This is a significant effort to professionalize the military and could be further developed 
by expanding the purview of the State Ministry of Defense including other joint training 
institutes, the KDU and the JSLTI. 
The military’s effectiveness was positively affected by the continuation of 
security. Now the military has the opportunity to assess the lessons learned and formulate 
new strategies and structures to prevent the emergence of any insurgency. The Army 
established the Army Training Command (ARTRAC) to revise and formulate doctrines 
and established seven Security Force Headquarters (SFHQs) island-wide to assist the 
police when required and to respond to disasters. Similarly, the Navy and the Air Force 
also did redeployments and development of their doctrines. The military needs to 
redefine its missions in the current strategic environment, however. In addition, the 
defense budget continued to grow with the addition of the UDA to the MOD. Also, the 
defense budget will remain because the major amount of the budget goes for recurrent 
expenditure, such as the pay and allowances of military personnel. Given the sensitivity 
of downsizing the military due to possible adverse social and economic impacts, military 
strength remains unchanged.    
4.  Summary of the Analysis  
Post-conflict militarization is an eventual process in the Sri Lankan context. The 
period from 1948 to the 1970s was a demilitarized era due to the absence of any 
formidable threats to security. Thus, the successive governments used the military for 
non-military tasks to solve political problems resultant from their policies. In the short 
term, the military’s deployment in internal roles was successful in achieving these goals; 
in the longer term, however, it led to the politicization and ethnicization of the military. 
Since 1971, Sri Lanka has faced insurgencies that posed formidable threats to the state’s 
sovereignty. In response, the successive governments used the military to counter those 
insurgencies. Decades of counterinsurgency campaigns eventually resulted in the 
militarization of the country.  
The defeat of the LTTE did not mark an end to the insurgency. Thus, the GoSL 
continued the militarization to consolidate security and to implement post-conflict 
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reconstruction tasks. The post-conflict militarization resulted in more short-term positive 
effects and more negative effects in the longer term toward democratic consolidation and 
the CMR. Also, the external support became a variable for the CMR. Although the critics 
suggest downsizing the military and demilitarizing the Northern and Eastern Provinces, 
the GoSL cannot implement such measures immediately. Rapid implementation of such 
measures would lead to political and economic instability in the country. Thus, 
demilitarization has to be a phased process, which has to take into account the current 
strategic environment 
B. CONCLUSION     
This thesis argues that the deployment of the military in post-conflict 
reconstruction creates positive and negative implications toward the democratization of 
Sri Lanka. The review of the existing literature on the subject establishes the theoretical 
framework on democratic consolidation and CMR, and their applications in the Sri 
Lankan context. Having established a framework, the thesis sets the background for 
understanding the implications of the political developments from 1948 to 2009 for 
democratization, as well as gradual militarization. In sum, the main finding of this thesis 
is that Sri Lanka’s post-conflict militarization has short-term positive implications and 
long-term negative implications towards democratic consolidation and the CMR.  
First, the thesis finds that the militarization of Sri Lanka is not a new 
phenomenon, but a gradual process due to a long-time insurgency threat. Since 
independence in 1948, political power has alternated between the two major political 
parties, the UNP and the SLFP, or coalitions led by them. The political competition 
between the two parties, and the significant influence of left-wing radical and militant 
political parties, particularly the JVP, shaped the policies of the successive governments. 
The combination of nationalistic politics and the failure or slow progress of economic 
policies eventually resulted in two insurgencies. The 1971 and 1987–1990 JVP 
insurrections and the LTTE’s terrorism from the 1970s to 2009 ravaged the country. In 
response, the successive governments deployed the military in counterinsurgency efforts. 
Thus, militarization became a persistent theme from the 1970s onwards.  
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Second, since independence, the military performed a firefighter role (multiple 
tasks) as well as a police officer role (law enforcement). The deployment of the military 
in non-military roles became a constant practice of the successive governments during 
pressing problems, such as breakdown of law and order and essential services due to the 
lack of capable institutions to undertake development projects. Since independence, the 
GoSL deployed the military to maintain vital services during strikes. Also, the military 
frequently assisted the police in maintaining law and order. The use of the military by the 
GoSL in addressing the LTTE’s terrorism had two purposes. The military prevented the 
LTTE from achieving its goals of establishing the separate state through military means 
and pushed the group to the negotiating table; the GoSL searched for a negotiated 
political solution. In the end, the GoSL militarily defeated the LTTE due to the failure of 
negotiations end as shown in the case of the Norwegian-brokered CFA . Given the 
strategic environment prevailing in 2009, it is not strange that the GoSL deployed the 
military in post-conflict reconstruction. 
Third, the power alternation between the UNP and the SLFP, or coalitions led by 
them, resulted in the politicization and ethnicization of the military, which had a long-
term impact on democratization. Both the UNP and the SLFP politicized the military  by 
using the symbols of Sinhalese ethnicity to mobilize and recruit for the nation. The 
conflict between the GoSL and the LTTE further increased the process as the LTTE 
attacks focused on the Sinhalese. This negatively affected the military’s professionalism. 
As discussed in the chapter III, an ethnically mixed military would be a more credible 
national force. Also, in the future, it would be a significant step toward the ongoing 
reconciliation process. 
The fourth important implication of the findings is the need for the military to 
redefine its mission. The defeat of the LTTE ended the military’s long-lasting 
counterinsurgency mission. Given the magnitude of the Tamil diaspora’s quest for a 
separate state and non-traditional threats, such as transnational crimes, the military has to 
continue its firefighter role until relevant agencies are capable to undertake their 
responsibilities. Sri Lanka could be the peacemaker of South Asia by being neutral 
amidst the superpower competition in the context of an Indo-Asia-Pacific security 
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construct, due to its non-alignment with those super powers. Thus, the military could 
eventually change to a peacekeeper role in the region. Providing security in the Sri 
Lankan maritime domain, assisting major powers to strengthen protection in the Indian 
Ocean vis a vis piracy, increasing participation in the UN peacekeeping missions, search 
and rescue during disasters, assisting the police to maintain law and order—these could 
become  the micro roles. For this, the military needs to develop conventional warfighting 
capabilities because, as Huntington notes, a conventionally capable force could undertake 
any micro roles.412  
Fifth, although the LTTE is defeated, the immediate downsizing of the military is 
not possible due to several reasons. The huge public opinion against the reduction of the 
military’s strength is the main reason. This results from the Sinhalese’ suspicion on the 
revival of the LTTE, which is reinforced by the activities of the Tamil diaspora and the 
Tamil Nadu’s governments, as discussed in chapter IV. Constructive diplomatic 
engagement with the Tamil diaspora and India, and increasing the military’s effectiveness 
through modernization would eventually help to change that public opinion. Also, the 
release of military personnel into society without a proper arrangement to re-employ 
them would lead to increased crime rates and economic instability in rural districts. Thus, 
it is necessary to have a mechanism to use the skills of military personnel for national 
development for now, and then to reintegrate the demobilized personnel into society with 
employment opportunities.    
Sixth, and very important implication is the effects of deployment of the military 
in firefighter and police officer roles toward democratic consolidation and the CMR. The 
security provided by the military during the insurgencies helped to develop all arenas of 
democratic consolidation, particularly, the protection of the state’ sovereignty. 
Deployment of the military under emergency law and the PTS severely affected the rule 
of law, however. The military’s deployment in nonmilitary tasks helped to develop the 
                                                 
412 Samuel P. Huntington, “Keynote: Non-Traditional Roles for the U.S. Military,” in Non-Combat 
Roles for the U.S. Military in the Post-Cold War Era, ed. James R. Graham (National Defense University 
Press, 1993), 12.  
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economy and supported the bureaucracy in the short term, but negatively affected the 
development of civil and political societies, and the bureaucracy, in the long term.  
Moreover, the undertaking of the civilian sphere of business by the military 
negatively affected the development of bureaucracy, as well as the private sector. 
Contrary to the criticism that an increased defense budget means less funding for 
development, in Sri Lanka, militarization helped the development of the economy during 
the conflict, as illustrated by the economic growth rate of the country. Thus, in spite of 
the wider belief that the military is not a suitable actor in post-conflict reconstruction, this 
thesis, using Linz and Stepan’s five arenas of democratic consolidation, finds that the 
deployment of the military positively affected the consolidation of democracy in the short 
term. It created a military involved in the economy and internal defense, which may have 
negative impacts in the longer term, however.  
In addition, the deployment of the military in internal roles positively and 
negatively affected the democratic CMR. Civilian governments have administered the 
country throughout its post-colonial history. Tensions for the CMR, however, occurred 
during suspected military coups resultant from the political use of the military by the 
governments in solving political problems, as shown in Chapter II. Also, the lack of 
oversight of the military during the conflict, its legitimate grievances due to its sacrifices 
in the field, its popularity among the public as the savior of the nation, and its autonomy 
may result in tensions for the CMR. Meanwhile, the conflict between the GoSL and the 
LTTE led to a dramatic increase of the military’s effectiveness. Greater experience, 
training and budgets helped to develop military strategies, professionalism and structures. 
Thus, using Bruneau and Matei’s newly conceptualized trinity framework of CMR, this 
thesis finds that the deployment of the military in post-conflict reconstruction has both 
positive and negative implications toward the democratic CMR.   
Finally, in Sri Lanka, the possibility for a military coup to succeed is unlikely 
anytime soon due to several reasons. First, the democratic civilian control of the military 
itself is strong enough to prevent any such attempt. Also, the military is controlled 
through the defense budget. Second, the military elites are knowledgeable of their 
responsibility in a democracy, that is, to be subservient to the elected civilian 
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government; in other words, the military has bought the idea that democracy is the only 
game in town. The division of the military on political allegiance, as illustrated by 
Chaminda Wijayaratne in his thesis, is the third underlining factor.413 When political 
power alternates between the UNP and the SLFP, the military tends to be politically 
neutral and restrained from developing corporate interests.  .  
It is necessary to further increase the civilian control of the military. The 
development of mechanisms for legislative oversight over budget appropriation and 
spending would be useful. Also, adequate budget allocation for infrastructure 
development and the welfare of the military could help it to disengage from economic 
activities to raise funds for those purposes. The syllabus of the DSCSC needs to include 
CMR as a subject and the introduction of seminars on CMR for high-ranking military 
officers would be useful. The further development of education is essential to inculcate 
the ethos of human security instead of mere national security. Thus, the development of 
the military’s professionalism is the best way to strengthen the civilian control of the 
military. Therefore, in the present strategic environment the best professional role for the 
Sri Lankan military would be the peacekeeper of the Indian Ocean. 
 
 
                                                 
413 Chaminda A.M.P. Wijayaratne,”Civil-military relations in Post-conflict Sri Lanka: Successful 
Civilian Consolidation in the Face of Political Competition,” (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2015), 94. 
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